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PAN AFRICAN RENAISSANCE?
Security and Economic Initiatives In SSA Sub-Regional Integration
Time past and time future 
Are both, perhaps, contained 
in time present... redeem the time.
- T.S. Eliot
We must all hang together
Or we shall assuredly hang separately.
- USA Declaration of 
Independence Drafter
Rabbit, rabbit where are you going?
I’m going out to kill the elephant.
Rabbit, rabbit can you really do that?
Well, I ’ll try... and try again.
- Great Lakes Proverb
I.
IN THE BEGINNING - PAN AFRICAN PRINCIPLES
Classical Pan Africanism was born in the diaspora late in the 19th Century and returned to the 
less repressed colonies soon after. Until the late 1940’s it was in large part continental in 
focus and external in main conferences.





These were seen as requiring an end to colonial rule, revival of pride and of 
innovation/evolution in African culture and governance and Africanisation of the economy or 
at least significant African roles at all levels in it, not merely as hewers of wood, drawers of 
water, recorders o f numbers and takers of dictation. Because of Pan Africanisms origins 
among expatriated Africans from many countries and the mutual support in striving for 
independence, classical Pan Africanism virtually assumed continental union at or soon after 
independence. The case was that self reliance required a critical mass and the avoidance of 
room for external actors to play off Africans against each other - as had been so prominent in 
pre colonial neo-colonialism and in colonial conquest.
Therefore continental (or SSA) union - focused on governance and armed forces - tended to 
be seen as necessary, natural and self evident. The entire approach was very broad brush 
partly because much was written from afar, partly because there was little experience on which 
to draw and partly because the immediate objective of dislodging colonial powers took up the 
lion’s share of thought as well as of praxis.
The high noon o f the classical Pan African vision and of the tide of perception and 
opinion expected to sweep on to African union came in the late 1950’s with:
a. the independence of Ghana under President Nkrumah, a proponent of radical Pan 
Africanism; and
b. President to be Julius Nyerere’s proposals for joint independence of Tanganyika, Kenya 
and Uganda (delaying the independence of Tanganyika) as a single federal state; and
c. the work of Leopold Sedar Senghor for a confederal francophone W est African State to 
preserve W est Africaness (or to outflank Le Vieux - Felix Houphouet Boigny - depending 
on perspective).
In retrospect the course of the Pan African drive from then on can be seen as “downhill all the 
way” until about 1980. Why this was so remains relevant because Pan Africanism has - 
despite massive setbacks - remained a concept with considerable popular and leadership 
political power and one arguably regaining applied practice attention since the 1980 founding 
of SADCC (now SADC).
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II.
IN VICTORY DEFEAT: THE COURSE TO INDEPENDENCE
The number of colonial territories and of colonial powers inevitably meant that independence 
struggles took different forms, struck different bargains with departing colonial powers 
and arrived at independence at widely varying dates (1957- raising of the Black Star of 
Ghana - through 1994 - the inauguration of Nelson Mandela).
The territorial nature of the independence struggles built up centrifugal, not unifying, forces 
even within the colonial federations or economic unions - French West and Equatorial Africa 
(AOF, AEF), British Central Africa (Rhodesias - Nyasaland), British East Africa (Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanganyika), Belgian Africa (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi). Cooperation among 
territorial liberation movements was often real and close - in AOF there was a dominant pan­
territorial party, the RDA. But it was basically analogous to interstate 
cooperation/coordination not to pan territorial union. By the time of independence substantial 
territorial loyalties and vested interests had been built up and old colonial era inter territorial 
rivalries and stresses internalised by the new nationalist leaders.
Even at the time, proponents of Pan Africanism warned that substantial periods of 
independence would create habits, loyalties and vested interests making union much harder - a 
proposition which lay behind Mwalimu Nyerere’s efforts to achieve joint federal or confederal 
independence for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. However, the reality that such barriers had 
already been created by territorial mobilisation, elections and at least partial pre-independence 
acquisition of power was inadequately perceived.
The most prominent barrier was in some cases that a united state can have only one president. 
In West African President Nkrumah openly aspired to that role - an evaluation totally 
unacceptable to Nigeria and the francophone states. President Nyerere made no such claims, 
but polls indicated he would easily win a T-U-K election (first in Tanzania and Uganda, a 
strong second in Kenya). Renouncing acquired power and subordinating territorial to 
interstate military authority were (rightly) seen as urgent by radical Pan-Africanists if the
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record of failed proto unions of early 19th Century Latin America were not to be replicated, 
but were sources of alarm - and to cutting back on Pan African commitments - to most 
territorial leaders.
Both the course of the dialogue on and struggle over the nature of the Organisation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the outcome of efforts at mini-unions illustrate just 
how strong the national (territorial) tendencies were as early as 1960.
m.
NKRUMAH-NYERERE DIVIDE?: A Revisitation To Reinterpret
The debate on classic Pan Africanism and speedy political and military union vs. slow, 
economic based integration in the early 1960’s is often posed as one between Osagyefo 
Nkrumah and Mwalimu Nyerere with the actual OAU/ECA tandem and its evolution a victory 
for the conservative, nationalist pragmatism of the latter. This is a distinctly inaccurate and 
unhelpful interpretation. Indeed in terms of the actual OAU-ECA-Integration evolution over
1960-1980 President Nyerere’s goals and vision were every bit as much the losers as those of 
President Nkrumah.
In respect to commitment to classical Pan Africanism’s goal o f continental unity 
Presidents Nkrumah and Nyerere were relatively close together with the real conceptual 
divide lay between them and a much more cautious conservative and nationalist 
position whose leading proponents were Presidents Houphouet Boigny of the Cote d ’Ivoire 
and Johnstone Kenyatta of Kenya while an intermediate group of whom the leading members 
were President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and the Nigerian leadership ultimately 
backed the conservative position.
This is not to suggest that there were no basic Nkrumah-Nyerere differences but they turned 
on paths, means and the nature of legitimate consent more than on objectives:
a. Nkrumah’s “seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto ye” led to a 
much lower attention to economic issues and means than Nyerere’s contention that 
independence was a basic condition for social and economic development;
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b. Nyerere, after the failure of his efforts to achieve a joint independence of Kenya-Uganda- 
Tanzania as an East African Union, was convinced economic means leading to economic 
integration - not a leap to political and military union - was the only practicable way 
toward Pan African unification. He did not disagree with Nkrumah’s contention that to 
will an end is to will an adequate means but did view the continental High 
Command/Government route as inadequate because unattainable;
c. Mwalimu believed in participatory consensus as the basis for political legitimacy and 
stability while Nkrumah was far more willing to seek to shout, face or force down 
opposition - an authoritarian reflex which, whatever its normative evaluation, was hardly 
practicable in an African heads of state context;
d. in the absence of a feasible road to immediate - or indeed imminent - political union and in 
light of the early independence history of - e.g. - Latin America and the recent, apparently 
‘unreal’ nature of African territorial boundaries, Mwalimu placed a high priority on 
arrangements to limit border wars, secessionist wars and full scale wars of conquest - 
goals which the OAU has, whatever its limitations, achieved to a surprising degree - cf 
Latin America 1810-1910;
e. further Nyerere - who did have close working links with neighbouring states (and 
independence movements) viewed sub-regional groupings among already ‘acquainted’ 
states as necessary building blocks toward the continental level with the OAU, ECA and 
ADB as - inter alia - means to broaden contact and mutual understanding/feeling at ease 
as well as more tangible links. Nkrumah, who was - along with Sekou Toure - isolated 
politically in West Africa, had no sympathy for sub-regionalism nor step by step 
approaches until very late in his presidency.
The conservative camp either did not believe in the classic Pan African goais or, to be kinder, 
had a radically revisionist interpretation of two insofar as they related to African unity. Self 
determination was defined fairly rigidly within the parameters of territorial states.
Cooperation among them and self reliance was posed in Euroafrican terms which critics saw 
as acceptance of neo-colonial dependency albeit this is for too simple and unkind a 
characterisation of the (ultimately failed) vision of Le Vieux (President Felix Houphouet 
Boigny) its most systematic and steadfast political proponent and articulator. Its agreement
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with President Nyerere was basically procedural and first stage - OAU as a forum of sovereign 
states, self defined sub-regional groups as the main means to operational cooperation with 
economics their main content. In respect to views on subsequent deeper and more political 
unification the divide was (as became much clearer in the 1970’s) very great.
The characterisation of President Nyerere’s stance - and later that of SADCC/SADC - as 
pragmatic and that of President Nkrumah - and later that of PTA - as radical is also 
misleading. President Nyerere was certainly willing to alter policies - even strategic policies - 
and to alter the balance of means quite drastically, but in order to hold to, not depart from, 
goals and principles. Two major cases illustrate. In 1961-2 in arguing for a participatory, 
competitive one party system Secretary General (as he then was) Nyerere explicitly said 
review might be needed in 30 years as unity and participation were the goals and ethnic, class 
or religious based parties (not multiple parties per se) the ills to be avoided. In 1992 he 
advocated a multi party system. Similarly in 1984-85 he backed the initiation of radical 
economic strategy reformulation not because he agreed with the ‘global’ neo-liberal consensus 
(any more than did Ministers Jamal and Msuya who had advocated the 1984-85 changes from 
1981) but because he was convinced no viable alternative to preserve the health-education- 
nutrition-national identity gains of 1961-1978 was in fact available.
Similarly President Nkrumah’s radicalism could often be interpreted as rapidly altering means 
to sustain power as much as pursuit of any more general principle. Like President Nyerere he 
believed that in the absence of a dynamic national entrepreneurial class a leading state 
economic role was necessary to achieve full economic participation (let alone self 
determination or self reliance), but - in comparison to Tanzania - the Ghanaian pattern of 
policies and actions lacked a coherent strategy, a defined set of sub goals and the ability to 
remain solvent even briefly and even in the favourable world economic and political economic 
context of 1958-1962. At a very different level when President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo 
was assassinated by Sergeant Eyadama (as he then was) acting for Jacques Foccart and the 
Elysee, Julius Nyerere wept in Dar es Salaam both at the imposition of neo colonial rule and 
the loss of innocence while according to Accra gossip (indicative even if possibly apocryphal) 




MINI UNIONS - MORTALITY AND MOBIDITY
Just before and just after independence a number of unions of two (or in one case three) 
territorial units were launched. The mortality rate has been very high - only two survive 
and neither can be said to be fully healthy.
Rhodesias-Nyasaland can perhaps be discounted as it was basically a settler ploy to retain 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) as an export and fiscal flow base and Malawi as a cheap labour 
reservoir for Southern Rhodesia. Two more - Ethiopia/Eritrea and Somalia/Somaliland - were 
externally engineered but appeared to have substantial initial domestic support. But the 
United Republic of Somali was never legally consummated (as i t’s own High Court ruled) and 
was established by force to die by force three decades later. Ethiopia/Eritrea (legally a 
confederation with a common crown) had its constitution suppressed by Ethiopia in 1961 
leading to civil war and a 1993 division. The Mali Federation (of Senegal and Mali, itself the 
hump of a proposed four state anti Cote d ’Ivoire union) lasted only a few months before 
relatively peaceful dissolution and the later Cape Verde-Guinea Bissau Union not much 
longer.
The Cameroon Federal Republic (the reunion of two halves of German Kamerun) and the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Tanganyika-Zanzibar) have survived. Neither is in any sense a 
model for or a stepping stone toward broader unity and in Zanzibar, Mainland Tanzania and 
West Cameroon a free and fair referendum would show a majority for dissolution.
Per contra  the colonial territorial units have proven remarkably durable. Neither 
boundary adjustments nor secession have been any more successful than unification, even 
where widely predicted (e.g. Nigeria, Congo-Zaire-Congo, Sudan). The only consummated 
case (or cases) relate to Mayotte (and perhaps Anjouan) island(s) in the Comoros Republic. A 
borderline case is the former South (British) Cameroon voting to reunite with East (French) 
Cameroon with which it had been a German colony while North (British) Cameroon opted for 
Nigeria. The Biafran war in Nigeria rapidly transmuted from secessionist into a Biafran 
attempt to conquer all of Southern Nigeria (and perhaps Nigeria). The Sudanese civil war has
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now thrown up a Sudanese Democratic Liberation Front (notably with only one S) - Northern 
democratic parties alliance committed to confederalism. Even in cases of near total collapse 
of states - e.g. Zaire, Liberia - creating a state, not multi successor creation, has resulted. 
Border tensions have existed but only Nigeria-Cameroon (plagued by a totally unclear British- 
German border agreement and fuelled by the probable presence of oil) has led to repeated 
conflict and that episodic and low key. The one ongoing interstate war in Africa is that of the 
Sahara Democratic Republic (recognised by the OAU and a majority of its members) to wrest 
independence from Morocco, the colonial power in succession to Spain.
The habit of functioning territorial governance and the process of struggle to end colonial rule 
has thrown up neither the Pan African Union many visionaries hoped for and anticipated nor 
the welter of ethnic mini states many observers projected and many Africans feared. Rather a 
durable - if in many cases poorly functioning, malgoverned or even vestigially - set of states 
has emerged and endured.
V.
THE END OF THE BEGINNING: OAU and EGA
In practice newly independent African states (and equally Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt) were 
singularly unwilling to merge sovereignty or to agree to substantial supranational institutions 
with real power especially in respect to armed forces. They were - in principle - enthusiastic 
about multinational economic initiatives in the abstract and in future perspective albeit much 
more equivocal about those inherited from the colonial era.
The former characteristic was general - the existing French and British pan territorial political 
structures were swept away whatever their previous nature, duration or potential uses to 
successor states. The reasons varied in detail, but real divergences of interest and lack of 
agreement on gain (not least high office) sharing were a common theme. The second varied - 
Francophone West African and Anglophone East African sub-regional economic structures 
(and independent state attachment to them in principle deep enough to cause devotion of 
major effort to restructuring, rehabilitation or even resurrection) did survive and apparently 
build independent roots into the mid 1970’s and each still has both real and potential political
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economic backing even though the east African one is largely both dead and superseded (by 
SADC and COMESA) while the West African one has become less important relatively and 
perhaps even absolutely.
The founding of the OAU as a multinational institution of states focusing on political issues 
external and common to its members amounted to taking five decisions:
a. Pan African union was not an immediate agenda item and could become so only if a
very large majority of state governments (continentally, SSA wide or sub-regionally) 
wished it to be;
b. in the meantime both intra state and inter state security required respecting boundaries 
at independence and rejection of forced union as well as of secession;
c. military coordination should be subject to ad hoc national contribution of forces under 
agreed OAU criteria (i.e. de facto  impossible);
d. Pan African liberation ideals were to remain focused on the last external bastions -
Rhodesias/Nyasaland, ‘Portuguese’ Africa, Namibia, South Africa;
e. except for external economic strategic issues (e.g. on occasion external debt and African 
common markets), economic regionalism would be delegated to ECA. (The OAU had 
no economic policy analysis unit of its own before 1994.)
f. The OAU therefore became from birth a club of governments com mitted to progress
within, and maintenance of, a system of national states.
The ECA was created as one of the UN system ’s global net of regional economic 
commissions within the central UN bureaucratic/administrative structure. Its remit was 
economic research and analysis with a focus on proposals relevant to national/regional 
economic development. While continentally oriented and relating to overall and topical 
African ministerial fora, it was (and is) legally accountable to New York and headed by a 
Secretary General appointed, and operating on a budget provided, from there. Institutionally 
it is, a t least in form, roughly analogous to a colonial administration with a metropolitan 
nam ed governor (albeit a territorial national) and civil service and a metropolitan determined 
budget with territorial advisory councils plus a significant territorial minority representation in
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the metropolitan parliament (General Assembly). In practice - given New York’s lack of the 
will or the means to impose detailed agendas - this gives a strong ECA Secretary General near 
independence from both African states and the SG, a role at least one played (or to critics 
overplayed) with very considerable diligence, skill and vision and to some substantial effect. 
Arguably such an institution was always a problematic partner for the OAU.
The political (OAU)/econom ic (ECA) or vision (OAlJ)/articulation (ECA) division of 
labour de fa c to  agreed in the early and mid 1960’s has proven durable (perhaps too 
durable) but has always been problematic:
a. operational politics and operational economics cannot neatly be divided in the way 
implicitly envisaged;
b. the O A U ’s personnel capacities have not enabled neither to make concrete proposals for 
articulation to the ECA nor to evaluate and enter into serious dialogue on the substance of 
ECA proposals:
c. the OAU has become - in Addis and in member states - a diplomats’ preserve and the ECA 
a social and economic ministerial and official one with further weakening of operational 
interaction nationally as well as continentally.
The impact of these arrangements on Pan Africanism and regionalism has proven to be major 
and severely negative even though neither the OAU nor ECA ever so intended:
a. the formal Pan African leadership in OAU hands contracted to the continuing 
liberation struggle because integration based on economic means passed to the ECA or 
individual states and political route integration had been virtually set to one side in 
adopting the club of states approach to OAU;
b. but ECA was not well equipped to handle the political realities of economic 
regionalism - though it certainly tried to fill this gap - nor to address intra regional 
bargaining over net gain sharing and status so that successful regional community 
launching and - especially - development depended in both ECOWAS and SADCC on a 
handful of state leaders playing catalytic and diplomatic mobilisation roles (in the latter
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case at cross purposes with ECA) and in that of PTA on the determination and dynamism 
of ECA’s then secretary general which, necessarily, could hardly be a continuing presence 
once it was established;
c. as a result Pan Africanism in the classical sense contracted, falling back largely to 
furthering liberation of remaining occupied territories (not unifying independent ones) and 
looking to stabilising the political kingdoms (with the economic to follow). On the 
economic front it was replaced not by the European Movement to EEC model of political 
visions through economic means but by an overly economistic set of sub-regional 
constructs with inadequate attention to the political economics of survival let alone the 
political dynamics of Pan African integration.
VI.
THE OAU, ECA AND REGIONALISM: 1965-1980 (1997?)
The de facto  division of labour OAU-political/ECA-economic endured and evolved over at
least a decade and a half and arguably remains basically unchanged to date.
The OAU’s main agenda items were:
a. averting border wars
b. discouraging - by non recognition and non support - secessionism;
c. pursuing the struggle for liberation of remaining colonies and South Africa;
d. coordinating African policy on major global issues seen as of direct concern to Africa;
e. promoting African interstate cooperation including regionalism;
f. eschewing state and OAU intervention in - broadly defined - “ internal affairs” of member
states.
In respect to the first two heads, the OAU had been remarkably successful up to 1990. The
main exception was Somali irredentism (or perhaps Somalian given that the only actual take­
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over was of Somaliland in a manner the High Court of the United Republic held to be invalid). 
The long running, albeit episodic, Nigerian-Cameroonian skirmishes turn on the interaction of 
a woefully defined boundary (the main channel of the Cross River, whose whole delta shifts 
north and south in addition to shifts in which is - at times are - the main channel) with a 
probable underlying oil reservoir. The Libyan-Tchadian war flowed from Vichy France’s 
purported ceding of territory to M ussolini’s Italy and Libya’s claim to be M ussolini’s heir.
But these stand out because they are exceptions - potential for irredentism, exceedingly vague 
or badly documented boundaries (including all ex-German territory water boundaries) and 
shifting in territorial lines during the colonial period could easily have spawned a hundred real 
wars - as they did during Latin America’s early years of independence.
Secessionist conflicts - except the break-up of last minute before or minute after independence 
unions - have been rare. The major examples - Biafra (if one ignores O jukwu’s clear drive to 
capture at least all of Southern Nigeria) and - at times- the Southern Sudan - have not been 
replicated. Borderline cases - e.g. Mali’s Touareg, Senegal’s Cassamantians - look more like 
autonomy or redress of grievances struggles than secessionist wars. Even in the Sudan case 
there have been periods of quasi federal rule and is now a unified Southern Liberation 
Movement-Northern Democratic Party coalition with an agreed proposed federal constitution 
seeking to oust the despotic military/mediaevalist Islamic sect government in Khartoum. (The 
Sudan’s main Islamic tendency - Mahdism - is firmly in the insurgent alliance camp).
In fact the OAU has been ultra conservative in cases such as Eritrea and the Republic of 
Somaliland (1994) where a merger of independent states on confederal terms had been 
violated by the larger entity so that a clear legal case for the legitimacy of separation existed. 
Eritrea became acceptable to the OAU only once it had the blessing of the new government in 
Addis while the Republic of Somaliland (which has a functioning government and public 
services) has no formal recognitions and clear de facto  recognition only from Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. The exception - the Sahara Democratic Republic whose territory was handed over to 
Morocco by Spain when it feared losing it - nearly tore the OAU apart before the SDR was 
seated (and Morocco withdrew).
Liberation relatively rapidly came to focus on Southern Africa - beyond the Ruvuma, 
Zaire/Congo and Zambesi rivers. The OAU was influential diplomatically and in coordinating 
African voices. However the Front line States group (by the early 1970’s Tanzania, Zambia
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and Botswana with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe added by the middle of 1980) was 
much more operationally significant than the OAU as - on the diplomatic front - arguably was 
Nigeria.
The contrast between rhetoric and structures and operational support turned on the O A U ’s 
general lack of resources - of finance and, largely as a consequence, personnel. The FLS saw 
a com pact grouping with close links (from 1961 on) to Liberation Movements as a preferable 
channel for resources than a weak OAU some of whose member’s relations with the old RSA 
seemed to be covertly collaborationist. Nigeria’s diplomatic offensive for the same reasons 
and to maximise prestige and influence gains was also kept largely separate from and at times 
imperfectly coordinated with either OAU or FLS.
Coordination was uneven but not negligible. Over dme Francophone African global stands 
have become less tied to those of the Elysee and more akin to those of Anglophone Africa. 
W est African diplomatic, political and economic stresses now turn more on Abidjan, Lagos 
and - secondarily - Dakar and Accra differences of interest than on either ideology or 
closeness to Paris (let alone London). However the coordination has had limits because of the 
O A U ’s weak economic analysis capacity. Common economic stances usually turn on ECA 
and/or single state initiatives and ECA background papers and even draft text preparation.
However, on integration the OAU de facto  dropped out of the picture. The two
exceptions - the Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1990) - were in practice 
ECA initiatives and texts (with nationally proposed amendments, particularly to support sub­
continental building blocks as a first stage) adopted by the OAU. Given that the OAU has 
been founded on rejection of early political union (and the experience with smaller union 
efforts was unpromising) and had little if any economic analysis capacity or serious 
participation of main economic ministers, this result - however unintended - was probably 
inevitable.
The avoidance of interference in internal affairs came to be read exceedingly broadly.
Tanzania for example was viewed as very much out of line when in the early 1970’s it charged 
the Micombero Regime in Burundi with genocide and - despite substantial unease by many 
states - Emperor Bokassa (CAE), President Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea), President 
Iddi Amin Dada (Uganda), President Mengistu Hailie Mariam (Ethopia) and President
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Mobutu Tse Tse Soko (Zaire) were members in good standing until they were internally 
overthrown in the first four cases and until the mid 1990’s in the last. This interpretation of 
non-interference neutered the OAU as a regional force toward good governance. (The 
African Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of People and Peoples was an initiative of 
Gambia’s President Jawara even if endorsed verbally by the OAU.) This did nothing for its 
reputation in Africa any more than abroad (nor for African self respect). By the early 1990’s 
the policy had become politically bankrupt because a series of nominally civil wars - Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia/Somaliland, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (then Zaire) - clearly 
interacted across borders and themselves spread instability and the real danger of war to their 
neighbours.
ECA - with a much larger budget and staff - took over the continental economic 
analysis and prescription role, nominally on behalf of OAU and under the leadership of 
Councils of National Ministers but in fact largely autonomously under the strategic vision and 
particular concerns (or lack thereof) of its Secretary Generals and their closest associates.
This was particularly true in respect to economic coordination, cooperation and community 
building which was an ECA focus over three decades to 1990.
ECA evolved from an industry by industry and key transport link approach to sub-regional 
community promotion to African Common Market prophetic leadership. The shift appears to 
relate in large part to its dominant 1975-90 figure, Professor Adebayo Adedeji - initially in his 
role as the driving force behind ECOWAS while a Nigerian cabinet minister and later as head 
of ECA. The results of sectoral, project, and a handful of country efforts to the late 1960’s 
were sparse and ECOWAS (and the then East African Community) appeared much more 
promising models. Partly because of an exceedingly unfortunate mutual misunderstanding 
between the FLS/SADCC and ECA (especially its key Southern African official Bax 
Nomvete), but also because only SADC/SADCC and PTA (which unfortunately overlapped) 
showed much signs of sub-regional economic dynamic building ECA from 1980 on focused 
increasingly on achieving an African Common Market by 2000. Whether this was any 
more a feasible direct objective than Nkrumah’s political union is a matter of judgement. 
Clearly it was at odds with deeper, more extensive sectoral coordination/integration and with 
linking of security and good governance into a ‘deep’ economic community building dynamic. 
Clearly too - at least in retrospect - it had no political base. Those states actually placing
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priority on political or political economic coordination/integration concentrated on 
SADCC and/or PTA while the others showed little signs of serious interest in continental 
Common Market Building.
In the 1980’s ECA became much more overtly political. It championed:
a. autonomous African directed recovery strategies (APPER and AASAP) and in that 
endeavour came into vehement conflict with the IFI’s and major external countries;
b. good governance - participation, accountability, honesty, frugality (in numerous annual 
reports and overall socio-political-economic projections). This did resonate with some 
audiences in Africa and externally but had limited (if any) impact on the regimes at which it 
was presumably most directed;
c. encouraged greater and more independent roles for African NGO’s (not very clearly 
defined nor differentiated from external NGO’s present in Africa) in the Arusha Charter 
which probably sdmulated and may marginally have strengthened the NGO’s but had little 
resonance with governments especially because major domestic social sector bodies (e.g. 
churches, mosques, trade unions) were not clearly included, whereas external N G O ’s 
(rapidly coming to be seen as neo-liberal state deconstruction tools or worse) apparently 
were.
The basic reasons for the shift were fairly clear. ECA if acting purely as economic technocrats 
could not address the 1980’s crises effectively and an ECA technical economic/OAU 
diplomatic division of labour left yawning political economic and good governance gaps. 
Professor Adedeji hoped to catalyse African leadership by outspoken initiatives from ECA 
based on at least some independent professional analysis. The results - while not negligible, 
especially in some African states, and potentially having longer gestation period results on 
both intellectual and official thinking- were disappointing.
ECA did not venture directly into most aspects of security. Its partial entry was largely at the 
household level - food, livelihood, safety nets - notably in the 1989 Khartoum Declaration 
from what was de fac to  a joint conference with UNICEF. Traditional military/policy/law and 
order security - probably prudently - it continued to view as outside its remit.
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As of 1990 the results - and especially the future - of ECA’s integration and political economic 
strategic initiatives were problematic but not necessarily gloomy. When Secretary General 
Adedeji resigned, ECA - in terms of strategic leadership whether analytical, strategic or 
intellectual - first slowed, then stalled and began to disintegrate.
VII. 
SUB REGIONAL TRAJECTORIES 1960-1980: 
Instability, Persistence, Unevenness, Deterioration
Over 1960-1980 Sub-Regionalism was both the central focus o f integration and its 
greatest source of frustration. Its two standard bearers: the East African Common Market 
and Services Organisation born again in 1967 as the East African Community, and the new 
Economic Community of West African States launched soon after, respectively disintegrated 
and stagnated. Elsewhere new sub-regional initiatives remained on paper and, of the old 
Francophone groupings UDEAC diminished and eroded while the W est African monetary and 
economic grouping, survived but at low and increasingly peripheral benefit levels.
However, while deeply disappointing that record was not as uniformly negative as a 
brusque summary of 1980 makes it appear to be. The cynical play on ECOWAS acronym 
as “The echo [of the EEC Treaty] was” underestimates both the forces that brought it into 
being, the continuing belief in it that has both prevented dissolution and also limited decay thus 
keeping in being the potential for its - partial - mid 1990’s recovery.
In the immediate post colonial period many colonial territory economic links were broken but 
a surprisingly high number - in Francophone West and Equatorial Africa and Anglophone East 
Africa - survived and, for a time, seemed to prosper under independent management. Joint 
arrangements for infrastructure and operating units (e.g. ports and railways) disintegrated 
rapidly except in East Africa (where they were in a real sense the backbone of the EAC’s 
emergence) and in respect to Senegal River Basin dams. Rather later (because independence 
came later) the Central African Common Market and its parallel institutions were dissolved 
because they were integrally tied to the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and 
because the independence of Zambia and Malawi left Southern Rhodesia (as it then was)
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under “responsible” settler governance. Unequal distribution of gains alone would not have 
led inevitably to dissolution - in the EACM-EACSO to EAC case it led to renegotiation and 
rebalancing. But in East Africa in the 1930’s the move to make Kenya a settler colony with 
“responsible” settler governance had failed so that all three states were majority ruled at 
independence and - whatever their differences - relations among Mzee Kenyatta, Dr Obote 
and Mwalimu Nyerere were very different from those among President Kaunda, Kamuzu 
Banda and any of the Rhodesian Front Prime Ministers.
Francophonia had West African and Equatorial African customs unions, common currencies, 
equalisation funds (to offset re-export losses of duty to interior states from port city breaking 
and wholesaling) and various other joint activities overseen by councils of ministers and 
officials and professional central bank staffs. These did provide direct gains - not least lower 
cost customs administration and a certain degree of manufacturing specialisation and 
intertrade - even if the special currency arrangements providing French external 
payments and deficit cover in return for a fixed metropolitan/peripheral franc exchange 
rate and severe restraints on fiscal use of the central bank were dominant. These 
monetary relations were part of the Eurafrican concept which - at least to Le Vieux and 
President Senghor - did offer a certain balance between preferences for French (later partly 
generalised to EU) goods, companies and personnel and French underwriting of fiscal and 
currency stability. However unwise or unequal they may in fact have been, they were not seen 
(at least in Dakar, Abidjan, Yaounde and Brazzaville) as one way streets or as the partnership 
of rider and horse.
While the colonial Francophone West African Federation (AOF) was effectively dismantled 
before and terminated at independence, the economic regional arrangements associated with it 
survived. The most important was a joint central bank with a fixed exchange rate with the 
French franc linked to severe limits on fiscal lending by the Bank and French underwriting of 
fiscal (subject to limits) and current account deficits. Whether a fixed exchange rate with the 
franc made much sense when the CFA countries inflation rates far exceeded France’s is open 
to question (the ultimate devaluation doubling the CFA/French Franc ratio came only in 1994) 
as is the viability of fixed parities among a very disparate group of economies with markedly 
different structural and growth (or stagnation) dynamics. The clear gain was the French 
Treasury underwriting of deficits and convertibility. The (substantial) interstate trade
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preferences (within an envelope of preferences to France and later EEC) did have some 
positive effect on trade (and because it suited French company concerns did to some degree 
disperse manufacturing) and the “ solidarity fund” (nominally a transfer channel from richer 
coastal Senegal and Cote d ’Ivoire to poorer landlocked states but in practice a reimbursement 
of revenue lost on re-exports from coastal to landlocked states under a customs allocation 
based on original declared destination of imports) did allow simplified transit trade and duty 
collection procedures consistent with avoiding loss of landlocked state net revenues.
These arrangements remained relatively stable through the 1970’s but - except for those 
related to the CFA franc and its French underwriting - eroded in the 1980’s. They showed 
little dynamism and new ventures - e.g. Air Afrique, the regional airline - tended to come to 
grief either because of clashes between national prestige/and commercial goals or - more 
seriously - from weak management and failure of sponsoring governments to pay their bills.
In principle the Francophone arrangements were no barrier to a broader ECOWAS grouping 
including the Anglophone states. In practice they were for four reasons:
a. France (but also Cote d ’Ivoire and Senegal) feared that Nigeria would be super- 
competitive economically and especially political economically;
b. the CFA states - reasonably - were quite unwilling to deconstruct their institutions 
until ECOWAS had a track record of offering larger gains (which it could not in the
monetary or aid field and did not in respect to trade);
c. continued Francophone African groupings linked to France’s Francophonic (basically 
France/Afrique) created grave (and partly unfounded) suspicions that while the voices 
were the voices of African leaders the hands were the hands of the French Treasury 
and the Elysee;
d. the combination of overvaluation but convertibility o f the CFA franc and 
overvaluation (often more extreme) and non-convertibility of Anglophone currencies
gave rise to complex, cumulative incentives to smuggling and to currency routing hardly 
conducive to positive officially visible interstate economic relations.
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The road to ECOWAS was initially mapped by ECA and Anglophone West Africa - notably 
Nigeria. Its most consistent and able advocate was Professor Adedeji and its political motor 
Nigeria which perceived West African regionalism under its leadership as economically (e.g. 
industrialisation) and politically potentially highly profitable. The process of convincing the 
Francophone states (and to a lesser extent Ghana) to join was a lengthy one taking a decade. 
The key facilitating mechanism may well have been a Nigerian funded (out of what proved to 
be fleeting oil generated surpluses) of a West African soft development finance institution tied 
to ECOWAS.
In form ECOWAS is modelled on the EU with a broad array of initial sectors and more added 
fairly regularly (perhaps to camouflage failure to progress in existing ones). While ECOWAS 
did set up a trade balance clearing mechanism, highly unrealistic official exchange rates and 
lagged or non clearing by debtors rapidly rendered it at best peripheral and no serious tariff 
preferences emerged despite interminable negotiations. An initially radical right of entry and 
establishment for all regional nationals dissolved back to visa free visit access as expelling 
foreigners proved politically popular in economic crisis periods, notably Ghana in the late 
1960’s and 1970’s and Nigeria in the 1990’s, but even more frequently - though on a lesser 
scale - in several Francophone states. Part of the problem was that Nigeria’s surpluses and 
thus the regional development fund evaporated and Nigerian industry proved both largely 
uncompetitive and domestic market fixated. Until late in the 1980’s, ECOWAS did not 
address security issues substantively either at macro level (e.g. coup prevention/exile 
activities) or at household (e.g. refugees/response to drought).
The East African Community (1967) had a history dating back to the 1920’s and common rail, 
port, posts and telecommunications, airline, tax collection, research and education institutions 
and - until just before the transition from EACSO/EACM to EAC - a common currency.
There was little divergence of view on its providing overall net gains but vehement difference 
in views both on static interterritorial distribution and on dynamic (growth) distribution 
impact. The one empirical study attempted suggested net gains of 2% to 3% of regional GDP 
dominated by joint public utilities, with Kenya’s net gain larger than the total regional, 
Uganda’s within the margin of error of estimation and Tanzania’s negative. Kenya’s own 
official public view was that it subsidised its partners statically but perhaps gained dynamically 
while Tanzania and (less clearly) Uganda saw themselves as present losers but potential
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gainers. Therefore restructuring was mutually agreed to be a necessity for survival and a
potential means both to sustainable regionalism and enhanced national economic development.
Restructuring - via a three member country dialogue at Ministerial level under an independent 
Chairman and concluded at a Heads of State Summit - involved a detailed formal treaty (with 
an independent dispute settlement procedure - in the event unused), two major excisions (the 
University of East Africa and - nominally separately - the East African Currency Board and its 
EA shilling), two substantial additions (the East African Development Bank and Eastern 
African Management Institute - both of which have survived EAC), substantial relocation of 
headquarters (previously all in Kenya) to achieve revenue/expenditure balance territorially, 
interim infant industry tariffs within EAC for Tanzania and Uganda and an EADB investment 
share weighted to assist their manufacturing sectors to catch up.
Before the Amin coup in Uganda and the external balance crises of the mid 1970’s, EAC 
looked to be succeeding. Tanzania appeared to have achieved static net gains (largely by 
reallocation) and substantially more dynamic export growth to Kenya. Negotiations had been 
begun for the accession of Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia with at least the first and 
second making substantial progress. Additional sectoral institutions in consultancy and 
balanced industrial promotion were also well on the way to agreement.
The Amin coup doomed EAC - albeit actual break-up was six years later. EA C ’s dynamic had 
been triangular. Two axes Kenya-Uganda and Kenya-Tanzania were economic relations with 
Kenya the stronger party in each (more so vis-a-vis Uganda which had no other viable route to 
the sea) and were balanced by the third which was political between Tanzania and Uganda 
(who had no substantial direct economic links) to counter Kenyan economic dominance.
While Tanzania agreed to work with Uganda at practical level (especially in EAC) it 
effectively never de jure  recognised the Amin regime. While many Uganda officials remained 
in post and some Ministers were familiar figures, Amin’s lack of interest in economic issues 
and violent reaction to initiatives by others meant Uganda could only deal with day to day 
business or - with a serious lag - crises not new directions nor strategy. Trust and momentum 
were lost and strains in the mid 1970’s over forex transfers built up rather than being resolved.
Other zones of the Continent can be sketched more briefly. Despite efforts including tentative 
institutionalisation, Mahgrebin economic sub-regionalism never really got off the ground.
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Partly this turned on tensions among the potential member states, partly on alternative non- 
regional zonal economic scenarios (Mediterranean - i.e. EU - African and other littoral, and 
Arab - i.e. North African - West Asian) and partly on Egyptian interest in Africa being both of 
moderate intensity and of substantial regional diversity (i.e. Khartoum, Lagos, Nairobi, Accra, 
Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Dakar almost as much as the Mahgreb).
The Horn (Sudan-Ethiopia/Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland) has not been perceived as a 
sub-region economically nor, until recently, politically. As a Northern extension of the 
Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (to which at one point all of its states 
adhered) it has been a technical and political minefield rather than a functioning zone.
The Indian Ocean island economies hardly constitute a zone by themselves as their links are 
either alm ost entirely European (Seychelles, Reunion, Comores) or European and Mainland 
African (Mauritius, Madagascar). Mauritius did become an active PTA/COMESA (and now 
also SADC) member for trade expansion reasons; Madagascar (distracted by domestic 
instability and a certain ambivalence as to its Africaness) has not.
Equatorial Africa ended colonialism with two quasi economic (or at least trade and monetary) 
unions - UDEAC among the five former French colonies and Congo Belge-Ruanda-Urundi in 
the Belgian sphere. The latter broke up at independence in 1960 and attempts to float 
successors (e.g. the High Economic Community of the Great Lakes) never had much reality. 
UDEAC lost members for a variety of reasons and eroded more than its Francophone W est 
African parallels albeit the central bank/common currency survived and even added Equatorial 
Guinea. The 1980’s attempt to create a Central African Economic Community (modelled on 
ECOW AS) achieved treaties and vestigial offices but no substantive reality.
The South African economic zone - with occupied Namibia and the ex High Commission 
Territories (BLS) as the core and Mozambique, the ex-Central African Federation states as the 
inner periphery and Angola, (then) Zaire, Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros as the outer 
periphery - was relatively strong but hardly Pan African (classical or otherwise). Indeed it 
was increasingly used (sometimes to the frustration of its economic technocratic managers) 
quite overtly in the opposite cause of making Southern Africa safe and profitable for 
apartheid.
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Other nominally regional economic groupings were either micro in nominal and mini in actual 
economic coverage, e.g. Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea, or overtly special purpose, e.g. Senegal 
and Kagera Basin authorities among those with a water/communication/land use focus based 
on coordinated development of specified cross frontier areas. These did not per se  conflict 
with broader sub-regional groupings, but nor were they logically building blocks toward a 
deeper broader dynamic. The African Development Bank might have played such a role but 
did not, apparently as a result of three factors:
a. it never articulated and gave programmatic content to its endorsement of economic 
regionalism and, indeed, only began to analyse it in any detail at the very end of the 
1980’s;
b. was repeatedly riven by inter African, African - External member rivalries and general 
lending programme viability/efficiency challenges; and
c. as a result, was never very clearly seen as an actor in sub-regional economic regionalism 
even though some sub-regional bodies (notably SADCC/SADC) thought it had a vocation 
for such a role and should articulate and implement one as did some senior ADB 
personnel.
VIII.
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN FRONT - ROADS TO SADCC
The one area in which the old Pan African ideal had remained overt and active over
1961-1980 was the unfinished liberation struggle in Southern African. That was an area 
of focus of the OAU albeit more diplomatically than practically given its limited resources (not 
least fund raising capacity and personnel). In fact the operational Pan Africanism was sub­
regional consisting of first Tanzania (when the only independent Southern - or quasi Southern 
- African state) and then the independent Southern African Front line States (growing in 1990 
to Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia).
The cooperation was at three levels - the political and diplomatic, the military and the 
economic. The first was regional and coordinated multilaterally from the start by
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Tanzania/FLS with the Liberation Movements as associates. The second - until the 1980’s 
was largely bilateral (Tanzania-Frelimo, Zambia-ZAPU, Mozambique-ZANU, Angola- 
SWAPO) depending on the main external base of the Liberation Movement in question. The 
A NC’s quasi military links were more varied but less substantial because there never was a full 
scale armed rebellion in South Africa (nor in the view of the FLS from the late 1980’s was 
such a route to liberation practicable). The economic cooperation was also bilateral with the 
initial focus on providing Zambia with rail, road and pipeline links to Dar es Salaam following 
the Illegal (Unilateral) Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia.
With the growing number of FLS members (plus independent, but not FLS, Malawi, Lesotho 
and Swaziland) and the growing experience in both regional and bilateral coordination 
thinking turned toward some form of regional entity. In the event the form was economic 
but fairly overtly economic means for political and security as well as economic ends.
The FLS remained the political and diplomatic coordinating body with the heads of state 
and ministerial meetings the main operational dynamic. The Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (later Southern African Development Community) became
the de fac to  economic wing of the FLS, but one including the three independent non-FLS 
numbers and very careful to ground its concrete programmes on economic necessity and 
viability even though it quite bluntly stated reduction of unilateral dependence on apartheid 
South Africa as one basic aim, endorsed the Namibian and South African liberation struggles 
and, in practice, had over half its early projects focused on achieving and sustaining viable 
non-South African transport and telecommunications links to the outside world.
SADCC therefore was a child both of the classical Pan African political and security 
and the ECA economic sub-regional economic integration strands. Unlike the earlier 
economic Community of West African States, and the parallel Eastern and Southern African 
Preferential Trade Area, it owed little to the detailed texts and tools of EEC ’s Treaty of Rome 
or to ECA midwifery. It was - and is - a creation of its Member States and of professional 
advisors (civil servants and academics increasingly from the sub-region) chosen by them. As a 
result it has viewed economic means as crucial, the selection of sectors to be a matter of 
perceived common interests more effectively - or only - pursued jointly than severally and of 
economic policies and projects being the instruments of political - and especially security - 
goals. In those respects it does resemble the founding principles of what now the European
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Union - creating links immunising against further European wars, using economic links and 
selecting sectors and policies sequentially on the basis of a joint perception of a need to act 
together. However, there is no evidence EC history was, overtly at least, prominent in pre- 
SADCC thinking - the combination was of security and development oriented politicians 
and applied political economy oriented civil service and academic professionals drawing 
on FLS and earlier African economic integration experience. The result was a much more 
politically oriented and both governmentally - and potentially enterprise and public - backed 
body than the standard common market model and of an initial declaration of principles 
(drafted in 1979, adapted in 1980 and enduring as an operational frame until the 1990 SADC 
Treaty) rather than a detailed founding treaty.
One aspect of SADCC is analogous to other African integration ventures - it is almost 
entirely inter not supra national (and intra executive since it has no legislative arm and an 
untested quasi judicial disputes resolution procedure). In principle its decisions at official and 
ministerial committee or commission as well as at heads of state levels are based on unanimity. 
In practice - like the FLS - they are based on a brokered consensus, vetoing except on clear 
basic national interest grounds is clearly not perceived as acceptable conduct any more 
than is a majority refusing to accommodate on secondary issues and formulations. 
However, that is very close to the EU system where even today most first order of import 
decisions are subject to national veto and the councils of national ministers can override the 
Commission.
IX.
SECURITY RECONSIDERED AND REDEFINED:
From The Beira Corridor To Kinshasa
SADCC/SADC have always been quite overtly about security: economic security, the 
economic defence of military security, economic diplomacy in support of (as well as parallel 
to) political, food security in the face of calamity (drought) and catastrophe (war), internal 
security in the sense of minimum standards of governance, external security in the sense of 
actions of neighbours (whether overtly externally aggressive or not) threatening the economic 
and social as well as political and military security of Member States. Until the early 1990’s
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this rather protean (or in more complimentary terms holistic) definition of security was implicit 
and intuitive built up from the “case law” of urgent strategic decisions and tactical 
programming to defend against threats to security. This combination of quite general 
principles, strategies to address overriding challenges to them, immediate concrete 
action and subsequent reflection, revision and coordination of themes is the main way in 
which SADCC can fairly said to have been pragmatic. It has also been pragmatic in preferring 
dialogue to shouting and dropping proposals for instruments which led to internal discord 
(e.g. an attempt to unify currencies) or fixed, uniform external disinterest (e.g. a Sub-Regional 
Development Bank combining direct lending, technical assistance and merchant banking).
In part this was a result of the sharp change in South African strategy over 1979-81.
1977-79 had been marked by a lull both in South African support for RENAMO and of 
aggressive action by it and its ally UNITA in Angola. Economic pressures via delays in 
transport, shifting cargo away from Maputo, reducing allowed hiring of Southern African 
workers, ending the gold arrangement on remittances to Mozambique (a long running one but 
not very large in term of subsidy until the end of the 1960’s when gold soared above the $35 
an ounce rate and one presumably allowed to run up to $200 million a year to support 
Portuguese resistance to FRELIMO, not Mozambican territorial development) and 
manipulation of trade volumes and prices were - accurately over 1977-80 - the perceived 
threats which SADCC sought to counter. In 1979-80 South African reorganised its economic 
offensive into the ‘Greater Southern Africa Co-Prosperity Sphere’ launched at Carleton 
House after SADCC’s Arusha Conference and, perhaps more significantly, added a 
military/political destabilisation front to create a unified Forward Strategy to make 
Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid. As a result the tactic against the 1980 
SADCC Consultative Conference in Maputo was a counter forum in Mbabane, but to the 
1981 Blantyre SADCC Conference was armed attacks on oil facilities and navigation aids at 
Beira (then one of Malawi’s two main ports).
SADCC adjusted - the transport and communications sectors’ work rapidly became 
focused on creating (especially in respect to ground satellite stations) or repairing/renewing 
(especially in respect to the rail and port corridors to Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Ncala, Luanda 
and - most crucial - Beira) to maintain or achieve secure routes among SADCC states and 
with the outside world bypassing South Africa. The project clusters were economically
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analysed and economically sound (the South African routes were longer and had greater 
satellite and port bottlenecks) but the overriding concerns were to avert Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Angola and avoid Malawi, Swaziland and (to a lesser degree) Zambia being 
left totally dependent on South African road-rail-port-telecoms links.
The military/economic interaction shows most clearly in the Defence of the Beira Corridor, 
Zimbabwe’s key independent route to the sea (road, rail, pipeline). Defence coordination 
involved Mozambique, Zimbabwe and at a later stage Tanzania. Diplomatic focused on 
pressuring Malawi to end rest, relaxation, reprovisioning and regrouping bases for Renamo; 
economic on mobilising resources and personnel to overcome 1972-79 deferred maintenance 
and damage from South African/Renamo raids to keep port, pipeline, road and rail rolling and 
- via the mixed (public/private, Zimbabwe/Mozambique) Beira Corridor Authority - build up 
the corridor’s economy. Each of the coordinated fronts was successful. The 1987 battles 
outside Quelimane and at the Sena Bridge on the Zambesi defeating the Buffalo 
Brigade/Renamo forces were the eastern parallel to South Africa’s defeat in the skies over 
Cuito Canavale in the West, while in 1986-87 Malawi ended large scale RENAMO basing 
facilities. And - central to the SADCC front - the corridor traffic rolled on. These outcomes 
it must be said were close run and without the regional collaboration via FLS/SADCC the fall 
of Quelimane and of Beira, the blockade of Zimbabwe and even the launch of Rombezia 
(Malawi-Northern Mozambique) might well have happened.
SADCC also sought to address more directly economic security - national and household - 
in respect to food. 1985-87 efforts at Annual Consultative Conferences had limited results. 
In part this related to apparently separate (or at best parallel) national and regional 
programmes, in part to weaknesses on most proposals and - perhaps most key - the non fit 
between Consultative Conference and emergency hunger appeal timings and between the 
bilateral and multilateral officials at SADCC meetings and these who actually dealt with 
emergency/humanitarian relief. By the time of the Great Drought of 1991-92 and the Great 
Dearth (and prospective Great Famine) of 1992-93, SADCC’s Food Security Unit had learned 
from experience. It had the earliest definitive data for the region and for several countries; 
coordinated holistic national appeals and launched a awareness and mobilisation campaign 
early in 1992. This led to earlier international assessment (and confirmation of most SADCC 
estimates and analysis) and an early donor conference cosponsored by SADCC and the UN
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which achieved just enough grain just in time to avert mass starvation. A parallel S ADCC- 
RS A (by then en route to the New South Africa) transport coordination group achieved 
substantial logistical success- only the routes via South Africa (overprogrammed by donors 
against SADCC/SARR advice) developed serious bottlenecks.
During the SADC period has water come to be a security focus. At household level this 
relates to pre-emptive maintenance of extant facilities and building up more drought secure 
sources notably in the Limpopo Valley and for Beira and Maputo. Nationally it turns on water 
agreements on transborder rivers and potentially, coordinated river basin management.
Because Southern Africa faces growing overall water shortages such agreements (specifically 
set out as a sector priority with dated progress targets) are essential to averting severe 
tensions and, potentially, war. The problems were realised earlier, but as the Orange, Zambesi 
and Kunene River clusters involved both occupied Namibia and South Africa; the Okavango 
basin occupied Namibia and the Mozambique-Swaziland-Vaal and Limpopo basin ones South 
Africa, no action was seen as possible before the 1990’s..
Cross border cooperation against crime - especially the arms, drugs and stolen vehicle 
trades - was largely impossible prior to the 1990’s. By 1992 it had begun on a tentative basis 
and by 1994 illegal mass immigration was also seen as a common concern.
However, both at governmental and civil society level, a perception had developed that 
without household physical and economic security national crime and massive 
population movement security concerns could not be handled. The corridors of 
development approach (notably Maputo-South Africa) was intended, at least in part, to meet 
the household level challenge by increasing deep poverty areas’ livelihood development 
possibilities (in southern Mozambique in the Maputo Corridor case).
A parallel rethinking related to acceptable governance. SADCC had always been concerned 
about a degree of “like mindedness” and minimum acceptable governance standards. In 
particular it was very anti military coups - seriously considering excluding the 1986 Lesotho 
government. The 1994 Lesotho military coup with a (usurper’s) royal face caused it to act 
decisively. No SADC state recognised the coupsters and SADC - like its members - 
continued to recognise the elected government. In its support South Africa (and in parallel its 
civil society especially the trade union sector) gradually tightened an economic blockade while
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Botswana-Zimbabwe-South Africa negotiated a non-violent restoration of the elected 
government. The contrast with the parallel - except for regional response - case of Gambia is 
instructive. However, the very special conditions (an elected government which could 
credibly continue to be recognised and the ease of a total blockade) were probably not fully 
recognised - thus ECOW AS’s problems in attempting a parallel 1997 exercise in support of 
the elected government of Sierra Leone against a mutinous army/internal rebel coup.
In 1993-94 SADC and its member states had extensive dialogue and discussion sessions with 
each other and (especially, but not only, in South Africa and Namibia) with civil society 
groups culminating in the 1994 Windhoek Conference. Here the definition of security as 
household to regional and survival/livelihood to military and the need for a holistic multi­
sectoral approach addressing base causes as well as symptoms were broadly agreed. 
Subsequent institutional development has been more tentative - perhaps deliberately. A 
council system (official/ministerial) reporting to Heads of State has been set up - nominally 
parallel to rather than an integral part of SADC but involving the same countries and serviced 
by a secretariat in the Gaborone SADC headquarters. It is composed of Foreign-Defence- 
Home Affairs (Police, Immigration) representatives. However, Food Security and Water 
clearly also have roles in the broad concept of security as do corridor projects and other 
SADC programmes intended to raise livelihood opportunities of poor households.
In practice the security action has been either low profile (crime prevention, immigration 
management) or fronted by a single state (usually South Africa or Zimbabwe) speaking on 
behalf of all (or most). The 1995 Commonwealth decisions on Nigeria were in large part 
made possible by Zimbabwe, subsequently backed by South Africa. The motivation appears 
to have been two fold - the denial of decent governance to and imposition of military 
tyranny on any Africans threatens all Africans, and African self respect requires a clear 
stand by African states (not just outsiders) on the Abacha regime. Over 1995-1997 the 
SADC security group became increasingly involved in the Great Lakes crisis and the 
revolutionary ouster of Mobutu. Here, there were precise SADC concerns - the economies 
and military security of Tanzania, Zambia and Angola were threatened (Mobutu was a firm 
UNITA backer and vica versa). The South African leadership role in respect to regional 
‘m ediation’ in respect to Zaire (as it then was) clearly aimed at reducing economic strains on 
and military risks to the three member states and equally clearly saw as speedy a handover of
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power (with the lowest possible level of bloodshed) by Mobutu as a necessary com ponent in 
achieving that goal. How much influence (e.g. by offering cooperation and/or membership) on 
President Kabila’s Congo government South Africa and/or SADC have and or can achieve 
remains unclear, but Mobutu and his genocidal Hutu revanchist allies no longer threaten 
Angola, Zambia and Tanzania while UNITA’s ability to revert to war for a second time is 
crippled. Angola’s intervention in Congo (Brazzaville) is almost certainly not an agreed 
SADC position as it has installed a militia coup regime against an elected government and 
(because of Interahamwe mercenaries in General Sassou - Nquessa’s forces) prejudices 
relations with Congo (ex Zaire) even if it shuts another previously open door to UNITA.
X.
PARALLEL SECURITY VENTURES: The Horn and the Freed Slave States
The return of SADCC/SADC to security considerations turned in part on leadership at 
Presidential, Ministerial and official levels and in part on the particular context of the Southern 
African Liberation Struggle. It was also facilitated by the definition of purpose as furtherance 
of common interests perceived as such by its member states and of structuring integral state 
involvement into central decision making and sectoral programme articulation. Certainly it 
was these characteristics (together with its clear linkage to the history of liberation) which 
facilitated rapid South African accession after the change of government and kept a real - 
however uneven among sectors and countries - economic coordination toward integration 
economic dynamic moving. However, SADCC/SADC was not unique - the challenges of 
the 1980’s and 1990’s have included a rising number of civil wars with dire sub-regional 
consequences because of spillover (refugees, violence) impact on their neighbours. While 
COMESA (perhaps surprisingly) has not sought to act on these altered realities, ECOWAS 
has, as has the Horn-Kenya Intergovernmental Group Against Drought and for Development 
which was initially a (decreasingly effective) locust, quelea bird and drought combating body 
associated with food security.
ECOWAS moved into security operations first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone although 
between the two it notably failed to do so in Gambia in 1994 where its action would almost 
certainly have led to the relatively speedy and non violent restoration of SSA’s longest running
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multi party election chosen democratic government. The road to security operations - 
including, unlike SADC, deployment of substantial multi country armed forces much more 
willing (admittedly not hard) to take proactive and reactive combat roles than UN 
peacekeeping forces - is perhaps typical of ECOWAS dynamics. The initiative in both cases 
was Nigerian (as apparently was the key decision not to act in the Gambian case) and the 
doubtful, bystander or in some cases counter acting states were Cote d ’Ivoire and Senegal 
albeit Ghana and Guinea were prominent Nigerian allies and the Cote d ’Ivoire (under pressure 
of massive refugee flows and episodic spillover of violence) came to acquiesce in ECOWAS 
action albeit not providing significant personnel. The inaction on Gambia probably turned on 
Senegal’s clear (if misguided) preference for the coupsters it did not know over President 
Jawara whom it did know in respect to halting entrepot (as seen from Banjual) smuggling (in 
D akar’s optic) trade and facilitating action against the Casamance rebels but Nigeria and 
Ghana could probably have forced ECOWAS to provide a cover for action to see off the 
cowboy Lieutenants.
Nigeria initially intervened unilaterally in Liberia to prop up President Doe - the sergeant 
being a friend of Nigeria’s then military leaders. As the situation deteriorated Nigeria sought 
ECOWAS backing (or cover) and adopted a less partisan political stance. The tortuous series 
of negotiations and (oft broken) agreements among Liberian fractions and the oscillating 
degrees of competence and effectiveness of the ECOWAS forces (eventually OAU and UN 
blessed and partly Northwestern state funded) did lead to a truce, partial disarmament and a 
reasonably free and fair 1997 election with a very clear outcome - ironically by the leader 
(Charles Taylor) Nigeria had initially intervened to block.
Sierra Leone has again featured Nigerian led involvement albeit Ghana and Guinea have been 
very keen on action because of the refugee crises the civil war imposed on them. The stepped 
up operations in 1996-97 appear to be a Nigerian response to international condemnation of 
its military governance. Protecting forces did facilitate a free and fair election but before any 
truce agreement/negotiating frame with the rebel RUF. The subsequent 1996 agreement 
broke down, when the Sierra Leone army staged at least its 10th major and 6th successful 
coup. ECOWAS has continued to recognise President Kabbah (in exile in Conakry but with 
village defence militias in the field in Sierra Leone), to hold bases in Freetown (notably the
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international airport) and to seek (by a mix of military and negotiating) means to pressure the 
mutineers to abandon their new RUF allies and accept the return of the lawful government.
Liberia and Sierra Leone have special histories. Both were established as homes for freed 
slaves (from the USA in Liberia and from the UK and - especially - from slaveships interdicted 
by the Royal Navy in Sierra Leone). Both developed highly polarised socio political 
structures pitting Afro-Americans, and Creoles respectively against ‘tribals’. In Liberia, the 
Doe Coup and its bloody aftermath were the definitive overthrow of the Afro-American 
establishment. In the Sierra Leone case, Creole political power ended (peaceably - by 
election) in the 1960’s. In both initial revolts and subsequent changes of government were 
army led (from the blocking of Siaka Stevens’ election in the 1970’s through the overthrow of 
President Kabbah in 1997 in Sierra Leone and from the Doe coup through a confused series of 
army fraction and semi ethnic group militias in Liberia). In each case good governance was 
totally absent - indeed had never existed in Liberia - and civil governance greatly eroded and 
manipulated to serve corrupt and corrupting interests even before the wars of the last decade. 
In both countries the actual practice of war has been brutal, indiscipined and humanly/socially 
corrosive. Whether ECOWAS has addressed this context and evolved a strategy for helping 
newly elected governments to restore good governance - including basic service delivery and 
total demobilisation of all armed bands (most certainly including the present so called Sierra 
Leone army) and training new loyal, professional police and army units is to date very 
doubtful. While the same criticism can be made of the UN, the EU and the USA and other 
bilateral donors, it remains an apparent weakness in ECOWAS’s security vision that it has to 
date only two major features - armed force to create a semi cessation of hostilities and a pact 
among armed fractions leading to an internationally assisted and monitored election. That, 
experience suggests, is not - by itself - enough to secure more than a truce.
The IGAD case is somewhat different from the ECOWAS because IGAD was previously an 
(almost non functional) special purpose group focused on drought response and insect/bird 
pest combating. The tentative renaissance as a security promotion forum (and, almost as a 
side-show, the drafting of an economic community treaty even though all of its members are 
also COMESA members) arose out of the long running civil wars in the Sudan and the 
collapse of civil governance in Somalia and more particularly the massive flows of refugees 
and, at least potentially, of massive armed conflict across borders.
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IGAD has held a number of series of official, ministerial and - incomplete - summit meetings 
focusing on dialogue to achieve a lasting settlement of the Sudanese civil war and to secure 
the re-emergence of recognisable (in both senses) territory wide civil governance in Somalia. 
All have broken down and there is little evidence of better future outcomes.
In fact an unofficial grouping of Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the de facto  Republic of 
Somaliland (the old British Somaliland) and the Sudanese alliance of the southern Liberation 
movements and the main northern Democratic parties has become much more a sub regional 
security group for the Horn than IGAD. (Uganda is not directly involved in respect to 
Somalia/Somaliland and Somaliland is not involved in respect to the Sudan. The Khartoum 
regime and the Somalian factions are not members and Somaliland only a partial de facto  one.)
This composition makes what might be called the Kampala-Addis-Asmara group more 
analogous to the FLS vis-a-vis South Africa than to a sub-regional group addressing the 
security concerns of its members.
a. in respect to the Sudan the military/minority Islamic fraction regime is perceived as the 
main obstacle to peace in the Sudan and security for both its people and its neighbours;
b. in Somalia/Somaliland the government of Somaliland is perceived as a valid government 
(and useful economic partner) whether as a separate state or part of a confederal Somalia; 
the irredentist Somali groups attacking Ethiopia (especially Ethiopia’s Somali Region and 
its leaders) as mortal enemies and the rest of the Somalia fractions as certainly part of the 
problem and only some as potentially part of any stable answer;
c. resulting in provision of bases, logistics, supplies and diplomatic promotion for the 
Sudanese alliance with the overt aim of assisting it to liberate the Sudan;
d. de fac to  recognition of Somaliland;
e. a policy of attacking bases for raids into Ethiopia parallel to encouragement for 
negotiation toward a confederal dynamic among other Somalia fractions.
In the case of the Sudan (and of Somaliland at least for the foreseeable future) a clear strategy 
exists. It requires a change (a violent change) of government in the Sudan. This is clearly 
inconsistent with the historic OAU stance but not necessarily with the views of its present
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Secretary General and a number of its members on how progress toward Horn peace and 
security might be furthered. The twin horrors of genocide in Rwanda and the intolerably 
protracted death of the Mobutu regime in (then) Zaire have vastly eroded the conviction and 
the intellectual foundations of the “internal affairs” doctrine as has the manifest fact that at 
least Liberia and Somalia have lacked any plausible pretence at national governments for well 
over half a decade.
The lack of clarity (or at least de facto  transparency) on means in the case of Somalia is 
arguably a weakness but equally arguably a strength. No alliance comparable to the main 
Liberation Movement (Southern) - main Islamic fraction (Mahdism) - main Democratic Parties 
(Northern) one in the case of the Sudan exists in Somalia. Ethiopia has neither the means nor 
the desire to impose a settlement and its overt backing of a fraction (even, or perhaps 
especially, if handled largely by Ethiopian Somalis) would run a high risk of being 
counterproductive. (Even in the Sudanese case, Ethiopia has deliberately encouraged Eritrea 
to provide the base for the de facto  government in exile and to be the leading diplomatic 
proponent of the Front.) Quarantining, attacking bases for raids, averting the spread of chaos 
to Somaliland and quietly encouraging discourse among fractions is arguably the least bad 
strategy.
XI. 
ECONOMIC MEANS IN FLUX - 1980/1996
The 1980’s saw significant progress in two sub regional economic organisations - SADCC and 
PTA - and their transformation into economic communities - SADC and COMESA - at the 
turn of the decade. ECOWAS and the Francophone West African groupings survived but 
the former failed to launch a serious economic coordination programme or achieve trade 
preferences while the latter continued trade - fiscal redistribution - currency union activities 
but with a general perception of relative stagnation or decline at least until 1994.
The fact that both relatively successful bodies were located in Eastern and Southern Africa 
suggests that, for whatever reasons this area was contextually better placed for regionalism. 
Further the reality that of the non-SADCC PTA members only Kenya and Mauritius and later
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Uganda were economically active (and that Mozambique and especially Angola economic 
involvement in trade was limited) suggests that an overriding condition for trade in 
PT A/COMES A was absence of domestic civil war and presence of a priority political 
economic motivation - key makets for Kenya and Mauritius and routes to the sea for Uganda. 
The two organisations were quite divergent in origins, overall approach and initial 
strategic instruments.
SADCC as discussed above was the product of the FLS with a focus on economic self 
determination, self reliance and security. Coordination of economic strategic and project 
clusters in transport, communications, food security, energy, animal disease control and 
agricultural research and extension were its core areas. Trade was somewhat latter in 
emerging with an articulated strategy and, when it did, focused on identifying 
complementarities, promoting commercial sector exchange of information, state facilitation of 
trade credit and harmonisation/simplification of customs-transit-interstate vehicle regulations, 
not on tariff preferences or commercial clearing arrangements. The reasons were complex:
a. to the extent the threats to economic (and political) survival were transport disruption and 
communications blockage or tapping, transport and communications maintenance and 
augmentation were a precondition both for trade and for survival:
b. more generally the physical, transport cost and information gap barriers to trade were 
perceived as more crucial than tariffs, while medium term swing credits and trade finance 
were thought to be key to reducing import quota constructions;
c. and in the longer term SADCC worked on the basis that coordination and expansion of 
production combined with pooling of information would be validated (not caused) by 
trade; and
d. PTA’s tariff preferences and commercial clearing were usable among SADCC states 
(except Botswana and, at that time, Angola) so that replication would waste effort and 
cause controversy.
SADCC also had substantial institutional and processual divergences from PTA’s standard 
central secretariat driven model. The driving forces in the official - ministerial - heads of state 
chain (advised at each level by the central and, where appropriate sectoral, secretariats) were
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the government members. Decisions were debated and drafts frequently amended, substituted 
or rejected as a matter of course. The central secretariat’s core staff (after two years of a 
Botswana seconded plus associated individuals interim secretariat) was kept small and by 
1988 comprised 100% citizens using consultants (citizen and outside world, individually 
chosen and ta provided) on special topics or reviews. The bulk of the staff were in sectoral 
units, each under the leadership of a member state with a priority interest in that sector. Staffs 
varied - dominantly citizens in agriculture and food security because Zimbabwe and Botswana 
had relevant professionals and funds to cover ‘free’ secondment, mixed in energy (where 
Angola had funds but less specialised personnel) and largely (though not exclusively especially 
in respect to policy) expatriates in Transport and Communication (where Mozambique had 
limited citizen professionals and less funds). Central (and sectoral) secretariat work centred 
on articulating strategic and policy proposals and referring back for approval leading 
(especially in the sectors) to programme and project collection-evaluation-coordination 
leading to sectoral draft regional programmes for state approval. In addition information 
collection, public relations and diplomacy (e.g. mobilising project support, negotiating the 
EEC-SADCC compact which was the first giving an ACP region a real voice in allocation and 
use of EEC regional funding) were secretariat duties.
PTA focused on neo-classical official trade barrier reduction - tariffs, quotas, customs and 
transit documentation and procedures and commercial (90 day) trade balance clearing. Unlike 
ECOW AS (much less other nominal sub-regional groupings) it achieved a series of tariff 
reduction rounds, at least substantial quota easing, a clearing mechanism based in the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe which did - with hiccups - clear and did cover the bulk of - rather narrowly 
defined - interstate current account balances and (albeit the driving force was UNCTAD and 
non-PTA SADCC states were involved in the exercise) at least significant customs, transit and 
interstate vehicle nomenclature forms and procedures harmonisation and simplification. In 
addition - after a false start via the old EADB (which Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania decided to 
reactivate on, and as, their own), it established a COMESA Trade Bank with not insignificant 
pledged resources. While interstate trade remained a low proportion of total external trade 
and most intra PTA trade was in a limited number of largely bilateral spokes centred on 
Nairobi and Harare, these achievements cannot fairly be described as negligible.
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Outside trade PTA was less effective. Its attempts to create a regional transport and 
communications plan and a regional early warning system directly conflicted with/duplicated 
sectors in which SADCC had functioning programmes. It did not focus on Indian Ocean 
shipping or coordination (merger?) of air transport where SADCC did little or nothing. The 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam based Northern and Central Transit corridors to Rwanda, 
Burundi, Zaire and Uganda are sometimes claimed as a PTA achievement, but in practice are 
the continuation of littoral/landlocked state forums, dialogues and programmes reaching back 
to the 1960’s.
Institutionally PTA had a relatively large and highly centralised secretariat which sought - via 
late presentation of information and production of decision texts which it clearly suggested 
should not be ‘challenged’ or amended by states - to dominate the PTA decision taking 
process. This was ‘successful’ and did speed ‘decisions’, but left a rather lower level of state 
commitment to the organisation or the ‘decided’ programmes than characterised SADCC.
Until the end of the 1980’s, SADCC and PTA clashed sharply on the appropriateness of 
external finance mobilisation and, therefore, the appropriateness of member/cooperating 
partner consultative conferences. PTA contended that involving outside sources of finance in 
regional programming was inherently “neo-colonial” and that nationally agreed projects should 
be nationally financed (presumably with nationally negotiated external finance components).
At times it suggested any other approach was fraudulent or subservient. While the view of 
many SADCC officials as well as national officials and ministers that this was a xenophobic 
smokescreen to cover up PTA ’s failure to unlock additional (or reallocated) finance for its 
programme may have been unfair, the exclusivist approach was never an option for 
SADCC:
a. to achieve a regional coordinated programme’s implementation required that additional 
resources be mobilised;
b. except for Botswana and - at some points in time - Angola, states could not mobilise 
additional domestic resources and - except under special conditions - could not be 
expected to reallocate substantial sums from national to regional projects;
c. therefore it was essential to secure external financial commitments - both additional and 
reallocated to regionally agreed priorities and projects;
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d. which could only be done by combining regionally agreed programme/project priority 
packages (to avert donor-individual state disruption of regional project and location 
priorities - a source of bitter resentment in the old EAC) with full discourse with 
prospective funders at a SADCC managed regional consultative conference.
SADCC’s sectoral reach made the financial flow issue much more central to it than to PTA 
since trade barrier reduction, documentation harmonisation and simplification and 90 day 
clearing houses do not require resources comparable to transport and communications (in 
which expenditure on regional programme components was approaching $500 million a year 
by the mid 1990’s) or even food security (where 1992-93 external emergency aid to the 
regional probably exceeded $500 million).
The issue of extending ability to implement via external cooperation versus being coopted  
by outsiders is ultimately an empirical one. On that test SADCC/SADC have “held the fort” :
a. clearly regionally oriented and coordinated programmes of expenditure in the public sector 
have risen - in a context of extreme resource scarcity - and by the late 1990’s were of the 
order of $1,000 million a year:
b. most of this - by the nature of the large, capital and import intensive projects which 
dominate transport, communications and energy - has come from abroad;
c. some - even if not all - of the external flows are additional (at least to Southern Africa) and 
more are reallocated from lower priority (or anti regional) projects which would otherwise 
have been financed;
d. especially in the 1990’s, sub-regionally oriented enterprise investment (e.g. in Beira 
Corridor and in export oriented manufacturing in several countries) has grown along with 
host domestic and external resources;
e. SADC runs the only Consultative Group programmed and managed by the recipients and 
putting up a cooperation proposal agenda analysed, evaluated prioritised and agreed by 
them (occasionally, but not usually, with some donor advice and/or adapted project 
suggestions);
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f. the Annual Consultative Conference - rather less central to SADCC (and especially 
SADC) than its share of total, and especially Northern, press coverage would suggest - is 
an open forum for sessional and corridor dialogue, but both the keynote theme setting 
address and the final draft communique are by its Chairman (the Ministerial Chairman of 
SADCC) on the advice of his own officials and consultants;
g. Donor preferences do affect the degree to which projects are funded, but occasional donor 
attempts to substitute projects or to interfere on political grounds with the structuring and 
scope of ones they accept have been vigorously - and largely successfully - resisted;
h. SADCC gained a reputation for hard headed economic approaches, dialogue (neither 
shouting nor passive acceptance) and pragmatism (accepting limits of attainable) at the 
same time it rejected occasional donor proposals on economic ideology, included ANC 
and SWAPO in conference attenders and sometimes speakers and criticised certain donor 
actions - e.g. Jonas Savimbi’s 1996 White House visit - firmly (even if not abusively).
This can not be fairly described as the record of “objective and subjective servants of neo­
colonial penetration” as has been asserted. In the context of the greatly constricted degrees of 
freedom open to small, poor, crisis wracked economies in the 1980s and 1990s it represents a 
not inconsiderable success in sustaining self determination and self respect even if - as SADC 
is the first to assert - the immediate levels of external reliance are too high.
The criticism that SADCC/SADC are in fact a regional transport and communication 
coordinating group and little more is in part too hasty, in part out of context and in part 
because focus on spending alone (i.e. not policy, strategy, trade and investment together with 
public sector investment projects) distorts. In part, however, it may have been fair comment 
until the mid 1990’s.
a. over 1980-1990 the economic and territorial survival of M ozambique and the
survival of Zimbabwe’s ability to stand up to South Africa (which ultimately rested on 
access via non South African routes to key imports (inter alia petroleum products, arms, 
vehicles and - in drought years - food) were at risk so that keeping the routes to 
Mozambican (and to a lesser extent Tanzanian) ports open was logically SADCC’s first 
priority;
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b. programmes to catch up on maintenance, to debottleneck, to expand existing links and 
to fill gaps were relatively non controversial with donors (albeit over 1980-85 they were 
somewhat disingenuously described as “new projects” to fit with the then donor fashion 
against rehabilitation, maintenance and restoration), could be produced quite rapidly and 
had clearer technical and (on the face of it) economic parameters than most other projects 
so attracted an overwhelming proportion of donor commitments;
c. per contra knowledge exchange and new research: e.g. in drought resistant crops and 
coordinated control programmes: e.g. against rinderpest, tse tse fly and the greater borer 
beetle, were much less cash intensive or high profile especially as their (at least partially 
achieved) purpose was to preempted impending disasters;
d. other sectors entailed substantial gestation -e.g. early warning systems and food 
security and hydroelectric grid interconnection and regional sourcing - so had little or no 
profile for years. But over 1980-90 Zimbabwe turned from projecting up to $2,000 new 
thermal stations to looking to a regional grid and major power imports (from Zimbabwe, 
and potentially Botswana and Angola, as well as Zambia) as the strategic way forward 
while the 1992-93 drought response has already been cited;
e. certain sectors - not least trade and mining - did stagnate because sectoral unit 
sponsoring countries did not have the ideas, personnel and finance to make them  
dynamic. That was in part a price of Member State involvement by sectoral sponsorship, 
but in part a reflection that the lagging areas either did not have wide priority backing (e.g. 
mining), posed serious problems in synthesising initially incompatible national positions 
(e.g. trade) or had no through roads to substantial breakthroughs (e.g. a regional 
development finance institution).
In the 1990’s both SADCC and PTA transformed themselves into economic communities - 
SADC and COMESA. In neither case did the change in name lead directly to a major shift in 
focus -SA D C ’s stress on security and COM ESA’s on trade barrier reduction (including trade 
finance and clearing) remained and evolved. However, for the first time SADC (unlike 
SADCC) set a common market as a goal. It added labour (including interstate employment) 
and water (particularly interstate river water use agreements) as sectors and in each sector 
began drawing up detailed subsectoral covenant objectives with target dates for progress.
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COMESA shifted toward greater stress on sub regional mobilisation of external resources for 
sub regional programming including the Trade Bank.
The single most important event of the mid 1990’s for S ADC/COMES A was South A frica’s 
decision to join SADC (virtually predictable given FLS and SADCC links of the ANC) and 
not to adhere to COM ESA (much less predictable). Structurally - as well as in terms of 
historic contact and support - SADC was easier: sectoral programmes other than trade (e.g. 
Maputo corridor, water use agreements, intra regional/interstate power contracts, transport 
and communications, animal disease control, marine fisheries, tourism, food security) offer 
clear potential gains both to South African and to its new partners and do so rapidly while 
negotiating a front end weighted South African and a back end weighted partner route to a 
common market is technically and politically much more difficult, not least because four 
SADCC partners are already in a customs union with South Africa. That meant that - apart 
from clearing and harmonisation - immediate gains to SA and COMESA from trade alone 
might have been low and negotiations tedious. That South Africa takes its economic links 
including trade with the sub-region seriously is demonstrated by its rejection of a number of 
EU proposals in its negotiations for a fresco style preferential toward free trade agreement on 
the grounds they would seriously impair SA-Southern African economic integration and 
conflict with its SADC obligations. SA ’s accession to SADC ended any chance COMESA 
could - as it continued to propose - simply absorb SADC. Its failure to adhere to COMESA 
poses a potential medium term crisis which is illustrated by M auritius’ sudden accession to 
SADC (in addition to its long standing COMESA membership) presumably because it sees 
achieving preferential access to South Africa’s market as essential. Kenya (and perhaps 
Uganda as much for regional security as trade or economic sectoral reasons) might well wish 
to follow the same course. If the Reserve Bank of South Africa then opened a parallel 
clearing system, COMESA might look very shaky indeed, unless and until the Horn becomes a 
potential area of economic/security integration under the leadership of Ethiopia, a new 
Sudanese regime and just conceivably (purely on security grounds) Uganda.
However at present both SADC and COMESA are, and are perceived by most of their 
members, as making progress and delivering some economic benefits. Mauritius for 
example does view COMESA as useful in respect to East African markets and joined SADC 
to extend preferential access to SA not to leave COMESA. The duty reduction quota easing,
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form and regulation harmonising and user friendlying, trade finance augmenting, commercial 
clearing core of COMESA is sound and in no way inherently contradictory to SADC 
membership. SADC’s successes have been, and remain largely, in sectors other than official 
trade barrier reduction. South A frica’s accession has broadened and augmented them. On 
tariff/quota preferences the challenges are:
a. avoiding conflicts for the 10 COMESA/SADCC co-members, a condition which 
moving rapidly to a de fac to  identical set of preferences to COM ESA’s among the 7 other 
than South Africa and its 4 customs union partners would meet for the short to medium 
term;
b. negotiating a non symmetrical barrier reduction between South Africa (and therefore 
unless a special arrangement can be devised the other SACUA members) and the 7 with 
initial cuts by RSA (and SACUA more generally) deeper;
c. averting a conflict between the EU’s desire for a (very partial) EU-SA free trade 
agreement and SA’s determination to foster, not torpedo, sub-regional integration.
The odd formulation that South African content in other SADC member exports to the EU 
will be treated ad hoc in assessing compliance with rules of origin postpones rather than 
resolving this problem;
d. negotiating to broaden COM ESA’s clearing mechanism coverage to all interested
and contiguous African states i.e. SADC-COMESA, including Congo (ex Zaire), and 
Madagascar.
None of these challenges is such as to pose technical or economic problems of great severity. 
Nor is there reason to doubt political commitment in the relevant states. Diplomatic problems 
on both the SADC-COMESA and the EU-SA (or EU-SA-SADC) axes may be more difficult 
to finesse.
In West Africa there has been a refurbishing of the Francophone free trade, tariff 
redistribution, monetary union arrangements. These appear to have been catalysed by the 
1994 devaluation and the desire to ensure continued French Treasury fiscal and forex cover. 
The occasion was taken to review re-examine, reaffirm, retitle (rather more than restructure or
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redirct) the regional arrangements as well. This may well increase benefit flows marginally, 
but they are likely to remain on a low plateau.
ECO W A S has shown some signs of renewed attempts to build operational programmes in 
some of its economic sectors and in particular to get a preferential tariff scheme into operation 
and to unblock the clearing house. If these succeed, they will provide an economic 
com plement to the security front and perhaps put ECOWAS on the road to at least a modest 
recovery albeit not a breakthrough to a status comparable to COMESA or SADC.
xn.
PAN AFRICAN RENAISSANCE: Reality, Cyclical Bubble Or Mirage?
Late 1990’s African sub-regionalism has in significant ways returned to the classical Pan 
African goals o f self determination, self respect and self reliance. It has focused on 
security and - to a point - governance and sought to link these to attainment of economic 
benefits and linkages. At least equally relevant it has acted as well as spoken. In COMESA 
(PTA) there is a functioning preferential market and clearing zone and first steps toward 
regional trade finance. However, COMESA is not linked in any realistic way to sectoral 
coordination/integration, to security or to the pursuit of political ends by economic means. 
ECOW AS has begun to develop a security policy and presence - even if hardly a uniform nor 
uniformly successful one - and may be moving toward at least some effective trade 
preferences. The francophone West African organisations have refurbished and consolidated 
their limited, but not insignificant trade, customs allocation/solidarity fund and monetary 
activities. SADCC has converted to SADC, acquired a new lead member (and a more 
substantial economic and intertrade volume) in South Africa as well as having successful 
security preservation operations in Lesotho (to avert the overthrow of a legitimate 
government and to encourage it to expand its links with the electorate) and potential security 
promotion in Congo (ex Zaire) to broker the end of the Mobutu era and - perhaps - to 
establish influence toward building good governance (and a new SADC member) there. It has 
continued and extended possibly low key but valuable sectoral coordination and food security 
work.
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This is on the face of it - and despite the many cases of economic and governance weakness, 
or even disintegration, as well as of internal war - the most positive balance sheet for Pan 
Africanism and for coherent progress toward political economic integration at the sub­
regional level in over three decades. Three questions arise:
1. is it real?
2. does it relate to Africa realities?
3. is the forward dynamic sustainable?
The short answer to the first question is - yes. There are limitations or potential 
inconsistencies/internal contradictions in each of the positive cases cited. For example 
Angola’s involvement in the Congo (Brazzaville) conflict - which appears not to have had 
broader SADCC Security Commission backing or, probably, even preknowledge - is at one 
level - consistent with enhancing Southern African peace and security. Pascal Lissouba was a 
long time UN1TA backer and Pointe Noire its most convenient logistical staging post after the 
loss of Mobutu/Kinshasa. But the victorious Cobra militia is apparantly riddled with 
Interahamwe ‘refugees’ and apparantly has shelled Kinshasa which bodes ill for SADC - and 
especially Angola - Congo (ex Zaire) relations unless the elimination of the IH elements can be 
brokered. But in general the inconsistencies and limitations are those of partial success, or at 
least of facing issues squarely, not deepening failure or denial.
The issue of relationship to African (or perhaps general regional and sub regional grouping) 
realities is both more complex and more problematic. Certainly the security focus arose out of 
national (since OAU efforts have to date been of very limited avail except as an umbrella 
backing none focused sub-regional initiatives) reassessments and reformulations. They have 
found means to create joint political, diplomatic and even military vehicles and actions 
with far from trivial results. In SADCC/SADC this process has been radical evolutionary 
from the continuing Pan African self determination strand, but now transmuted to include 
household (e.g. food), conflict preemption (e.g. water), decent governance (at the least no 
coups), and underlying causes (pockets of extreme poverty) as well as the classical armed 
forces - foreign office - police aspects. These do link the politics of security with those of 
legitimacy and both with economic means. ECOW AS’ evolution can be faulted in origin as 
too much an extension of Nigerian interests and perceptions, but in both Liberia and Sierra
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Leone has become something more. The economic rethinking has been on two parallel - but 
not inherently contradictory - strands: actually achieving legal trade barrier reduction coupled 
with reduction of physical and financial obstacles, building of a web of sectoral policy and 
project coordination (as with the economic means to political ends strand rather like the 
evolution to EU albeit net at all directly copied from it). Both are potentially African reality 
based albeit the need to ensure trade imbalances do not become so severe as to generate real 
or self perceived not losers and either stasis or disintegration is still far from strategically or 
operationally resolved (here the E U ’s massive Regional and Solidarity fund precedents are no 
help as neither ECOWAS, COMESA nor SADC has ‘rich’ members capable of financing 
them).
The dynamic sustainability question and in part the endogeneity/appropriateness (African 
context linked) questions often take the form of pointing to past false downs which either 
never materialised or rapidly stagnated or disintegrated: East African Community, ECOWAS 
to take the most prominent examples. In the cases of SADC and COMESA the answer is that 
SADC is now 17 years of age while EAC went into a coma after 7 and died at 10 while 
COMESA has a record of legal and procedural trade barrier reduction and trade facilitation 
built up cumulatively over a decade and a half unlike ECOWAS which went dead in the water 
on these fronts within 2 years of its launching.
W hether the present forward progress can be maintained is problematic. It has been 
achieved under most unpromising conditions and - in Eastern and Southern Africa - has both 
adapted to and influenced change. There the danger is perhaps a destructive clash between on 
vehicles between states focused on SADC and these focused on COMESA. In West Africa 
the dynamic is much more fragile, limited in results and vulnerable primarily because its 
governance problems both distract Nigeria and limit its perceived legitimacy as a regional 
leader.
On the other hand it is quite possible to identify two geographic zones in which dynamics 
parallel to (or linked with) that of SADC are not unrealistic possibilities over the next 5 to 
10 years: Congo (ex Zaire)/Greater East Africa (probably in a SADC frame), The Horn/- 
when a legitimate regime takes power in the Sudan and coordinates with Addis-Asmara- 
Hargeisa (initially probably with COMESA).
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On balance the most accurate present objective judgement would appear to be that there is a 
Pan African Renaissance based on African realities (political and economic) as perceived 
by African leaders which is real but also uneven by subregion, not yet encompassing half of 
SSA ’s states and - at least in West Africa - problematic as to whether it will be sustained. 
However, the near universal recognition of fragility and of barriers to sustainability is a 
positive sign - triumphalism would be much more worrying as to future trajectory.
XIII.
PAN AFRICANISM  TOWARD 2000/2007
To take 2000 as a target date is to give hostages to fortune - radical changes in SSA often 
come rapidly when they do come but their gestation periods have been regularly 
underestimated (though near the actual date of change overestimated). 2007 - the 50th 
Anniversary of the raising of the Black Star flag - might be a better medium term sighting 
date.
W hat are the key points around which sustainability of Pan Africanism as a major component 
in a renewed, sustainable developmental dynamic will turn and progress toward which (or 
otherwise) usable as both ex post tests and ex ante warning systems on the health of 
institutions and processes?
a. combining official, infrastructural (e.g. lack of transport and communication) and 
enterprise (e.g. non orientation to regional sourcing and selling) trade barrier reduction 
with coordinated household and enterprise production expansion to increase intra 
African trade;
b. building economic unification/coordination instruments beyond trade barrier 
reduction which are based on commonly perceived common interests more efficiently 
pursued together and which add up to an increasingly important positive economic 
impulse;
c. providing security mechanisms relevant to households (e.g. food security, freedom from 
armed incursions), societies (e.g. law and order, freedom from refugee and neighbouring
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violent chaos burdens) and countries (e.g. from massive military expenses and actual or 
standby security force mobilisations and/or operations) and have proactive, preventive, and 
mediatory as well as defensively reactive, crisis containing and quarantining elements;
d. developing a workable definition of mutual affairs (as contrasted with internal) and a 
practicable dynamic for pre-emptive diplomacy, mediation and/or intervention to forestall, 
reduce, contain and/or restore from armed conflict;
e. involving enterprises, civil society and citizens in a sub-regional dynamic that is more 
than diplomacy and more open than civil service/cabinet decision taking and implementing;
f. achieving and publicising results which do matter to ordinary people as well as to 
enterprises, activists and politicians - not necessarily hard if the first five conditions are 
met.
Trade promotion by official barrier reduction needs to be rethought in the context of 
the global tariff barrier reduction and quota elimination features of 1990’s globalism
promoted in Africa by international financial institutions. The lower basic tariffs, the less 
possibility exists for tariff preferences and the fewer and looser quota restrictions the less 
important will be quota preferences. This is not to say COMESA and SADC should not press 
forward to sub-regional common markets and ECOWAS develop a viable dynamic to the 
same end, but that even in the official barrier reduction sphere complementary measures will 
be needed.
SADC’s preferential trade regime could logically comprise:
a. adoption of PTA tariff preferences for all SADC members other than SA and coordinating 
future reduction rounds;
b. immediate RSA (and necessarily other SACUA member) preferential reductions for all 
other SADC members and in particular extending any free trade lines negotiated with EU 
to all SADC members (and for that matter all COMESA members or even all OAU 
members as a first step toward the Abuja Treaty goal of an African Common Market and 
to avert reverse discrimination for extra continental relative to African supplies);
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c. a phased, dated programme to give similar preferences to South Africa (arguably these 
could be extended to other SACUA members immediately, given rules of origin tests this 
should not be impossible).
Beyond the possible SADC-COMESA preference systems de facto  merger and the South 
African extension of EU duty free access to all OAU members, it is hard to identify any short 
term opportunities for progress toward an All African Common Market. In principle the 
North African states could extend fresco arrangement tariff preferences granted to the EU to 
other African states at no evident cost to themselves, but their political and political economic 
priorities are (except perhaps for Egypt) not such as to suggest this is a realistic short term 
option.
Important complementary trade measures include:
a. reactivating clearing agreements and broadening them to cover all interstate transactions 
within their sub-regions (including legal transit, re-export, invisibles and capital transfer 
items);
b. strengthening clearing by sub-regional Central Bank consultative groups which - inter 
alia - seek to reduce exchange rate over (or theoretically under) valuation obstacles to 
open trade and clearing particularly in respect to Angola, Congo (ex Zaire) and Nigeria;
c. completing customs nomenclature, procedural (especially valuation) and transit traffic 
arrangements and related vehicle licensing harmonisation - an exercise which in 
principle and perhaps in practice could be conducted continentally or at least by all SADC, 
COMESA and ECOWAS members and all other currently interested states;
d. eliminating “paper tariffs” (e.g. delays in clearing and release; repetitive rejection of 
papers for purely technical or typographical errors; ‘inexplicable’ delays or misrouting 
affecting transit traffic) which can nullify apparent preferences and indeed create nearly 
impermeable barriers to trade;
e. promotion - in close coordination with national and sub-regional enterprise fora - of 
looking to African markets and for African sources (a less than common practice in
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most Africa countries). Catalytic funding to exploratory trade visits and trade fair 
participation by enterprise and to (preferably enterprise run, internet oriented) commercial
The case for reducing legal and administrative barriers to trade is important but is 
complementary - rather than alternative - to reducing real (whether physical, information or 
outlook) barriers. Physical barriers are primarily transport and communications 
infrastructure. This has gaps but even more numerous sections in disrepair and high unit 
costs, e.g. the “natural protection” of Ethiopian manufactures with preferential duty access to 
the Kenyan market (and vica versa) against duty paid EU or Japanese or North American 
manufactures is significantly negative because there is no cost viable road route and the high 
cost and low reliability of coastal shipping (and Addis to Assab or Berbera) routes mean intra 
COMESA transport costs are above EU-Nairobi. Information barriers turn on lack of 
timeous, reliable, detailed commercial data as to sources, markets, routings, finances, 
specifications, administrative requirements etc. Ethiopian (like Zimbabwean) wine includes 
modest amounts of high and medium quality and could be competitive with South African in 
Kenya and Tanzania (as could Zimbabwean in Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya) 
but neither producers/exporters nor importers/wholesalers have the data to develop the trade 
on any systematic basis. Outlook barriers are linked to data (data not sought is rarely 
transmitted regularly) and to institutional (e.g. financial facilities) limitations.
SSA producers are in general not very export oriented and still less oriented to non-traditional 
(including SSA) exports. The commercial sector and the input procurement and investment 
sides of other sectors are import oriented (perhaps too much so) but with limited exceptions 
do not look to neighbours as sources. The disproportionate scope of South African exports 
(and to a lesser degree imports) from SSA and of both Zimbabwean and Kenya exports to 
neighbours are evidence that different outlooks (in conjunction with less official barriers and 
less exiguous transport and communication infrastructure) can cause structural shifts in export 
volumes and destinations and in import sourcing.
The reduction of non-legal/administrative barriers or “paper tariffs”, documentation 
diversities and obscurities and user unfriendly land frontier immigration/customs and
provision of improved clearing have several advantages over simple tariff preferences:
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a. analytically they are globally cost friendly because they reduce cost barriers to intra SSA 
trade improving resource allocation and reducing CIFC (cost including freight and 
commercialisation) ex user for SSA (or sub-regional) goods absolutely and relative to 
extra regional sources by cost efficient, market consistent ways rather than by raising costs 
to extraregional suppliers;
b. therefore they unambiguously reduce costs to SSA users while allowing higher production 
by SSA suppliers (which regional protection by preference is likely to increase user costs) 
and reduce trade diversion by levelling the market playing Field (whereas at best 
preferences level by offsetting unlevelling);
c. and are not, therefore, subject to challenge at WTO or to erosion by global trade
barrier liberalisation (which will continue and from which SSA cannot opt out) reducing 
headline tariffs and, pari passu, the room available for preferences.
At a deeper level production and employment are ends while international (or for that 
matter domestic) trade is a means to validate the production by linking supply to effective 
demand. This is a basic economic analysis point - whether in classical, neo-classical, Marxist 
or mainstream Northwestern thinking. Interestingly it is also a point which corresponds to 
politicians ‘and voters’ perceptions. They care about production, infrastructure and 
em ploym ent, not trade as such. The downside in respect to the political perception is an 
overemphasis on exports (justifying increased production and employment) and hostility to, 
or malign neglect of, intra sub-regional imports (seen as eating up market possibilities for 
domestic producers). The imbalance is dangerous, because - at least in SSA sub-regional 
contexts - unless poorer states can increase sub-regional exports they can rarely afford to 
increase sub-regional imports paid for with hard currency from extra-regional exports and 
borrowing. Even if they could - e.g. less poor states such as Botswana with ‘natural’ extra 
regional trade surpluses - they are hardly likely to wish to share the costs of regional 
protection unless they have countervailing gains whether in production for export, transit 
transport cost reduction, security or/and other sectors.
If production (including research and training), employment, transport and communications, 
food security, power, water management and classically defined security as well as trade are 
valid agenda items of sub-regional bodies, the issue arises whether uniform schedules,
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priorities and sequences can be set out. The answer is almost certainly no. Both contexts and 
perceptions/priorities differ. SADCCs initial position - and still more its 1982-90 evolving 
position - was very different from PTA’s. SADC’s post 1990 priority for sub-regional water 
agreements turns both on the clear facts of aridity of much of the region and the number of 
major interstate river basins combined with the perception that unless water use and associated 
aspects of river basin development can be agreed by treaty soon serious hostilities among 
states (at best) land even war must be foreseen well before 2010. Perhaps the most general 
principles that can be set out are:
a. an agenda of perceived common interests more effectively (or only) attainable jointly
(or on a coordinated basis) rather than severally;
b. which provide significant perceived benefits to each member state fairly rapidly as well 
as the prospect of rising benefits over time;
c. and are - in sum - large enough to make the process of regionalism a domestic priority 
for member states;
d. with a dynamic of adding and revising (and dropping in cases of clear non success) to 
maintain the forward dynamic and to deepen integration; as well as
e. an openness to considering gradual expansion of membership to broaden integration.
That set of principles (or guidelines) implies that there is no reason each state has to be 
deeply concerned with all sectors or sub-sectors let alone individual projects. For example 
marine fisheries in SADC are hardly of much concern to Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Zambia or Zimbabwe - albeit fresh water ones are in some cases - but are 
important to Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mauritius.
Similarly, while individual water use agreements and power grid linkages and interflows by 
their nature cannot involve all 12 SADC (let alone all 22 COMESA) states, the sectors are of 
concern to a substantial majority. Nor need net gains from each sector be large (indeed small 
losses on some may be acceptable) - it is the perceived sum which matters.
The new aspects of security are:
a. household (or individual or people’s) security e.g. food security;
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b. community security e.g. from overwhelming transborder flows of migrants and - more 
clearly in classic security terms - drugs, guns and other criminal activities.
Household security is a new aspect of sub-regionalism, at least in Africa. In SADCC/SADC it 
has turned on joint and coordinated agricultural research, veterinary research and disease 
control, early warning systems and joint mobilisation of data, resources and logistics to meet 
drought caused dearth. If successful, water management will have similar results cyclically in 
drought years and secularly for residents of water scarce interstate basins. The second aspect 
is in a sense a continuing one - immigration, drug, gun and crossborder crime cooperation are 
nothing new, albeit rarely high profile in SSA and a source of conundrums so long as the old 
South African existed. What is new is looking to causes - basically weakness of livelihood 
bases and domestic insecurity - and seeking to relate control measures to longer term 
proactive prevention e.g. in the proposed Mpulumanga - Maputo Corridor development zone.
The straightforward aspect of classical - basically military and external - security is joint action 
to face extra regional threats, e.g. the Mobutu Regime in Zaire by its conduct raised threats to 
the security of and imposed costs on Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. Experience indicated 
these would end only when the regime did. Thus South African/SADC “mediation” was really 
seeking a speedy, low violence modus vivendi to secure a transfer of power. A second aspect 
has recently come to be seen as straightforward at least in extreme cases - the total collapse 
into bloody (literally) chaos of a sub-regional state or a blatantly unlawful coup against a 
legitimate regime. ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone (albeit not in Gambia or Niger) have 
acted on this front as has SADC in respect of Lesotho
Developing operational definitions and workable procedures for intervention in 
“mutual affairs” is probably the most difficult challenge - especially in cases of member 
states (both within sub-regional groups and - especially - for the OAU). For adjacent states 
threats to physical security (by armed incursion, refugee waves and/or intervention in member 
internal conflicts) can in practice usually be identified with limited disagreement (e.g. Rwanda, 
Burundi, Congo-ex Zaire, Sudan) and do not face the problem of veto by the offending state 
acting as a member. However, even in such cases serious problems arise if most affected 
member states see the only viable solution as entailing a change of government and wish to act 
in support of actors seeking such a change by force (e.g. Uganda in Rwanda; Uganda, Rwanda 
and Angola in Zaire; Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea in Sudan). SADC escaped this in Zaire
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because Mobutu was already falling and lead military support intervenors (Uganda, Rwanda) 
are not SADC members, it faces potentially more serious problems in respect to Congo 
(Brazzaville) because while the change of regime lowers a threat to Angola it may create one 
to Congo (ex Zaire).
The problems in respect to violent changes of government within a subregion are greater, 
even if the presumptive right of the state in question to veto is either removed or side-stepped 
by temporarily continuing to recognise the ousted government. Further the initial ECOWAS 
problems in respect to intervention in Liberia and inability to agree in respect to Gambia 
suggest mutual agreement may not always be easy to achieve. In cases of domestic conflict 
involving an arguably (and previously) legitimate government the appropriateness as well as 
the feasibility of coercive action is highly problematic.
One guideline that probably could be agreed would be refusal to recognise coups against 
legitimate, elected governments and mediating with the threat of sanctions to achieve 
the reinstatement of the ousted government (e.g. Lesotho and Sierra Leone). Another - 
especially relevant to the OAU - would be to remove a state’s right to veto action designed to 
meet a security threat which it posed. General specifications beyond these are not now 
possible but might become so. In cases such as Lesotho 1996-97, (continued unrest relating 
to diminished legitimacy of the elected Prime Minister and smouldering unconstitutional 
tendencies in security services), Zambia (electoral laws ruling out key candidates and causing 
the main opposition parties to boycott) and Swaziland (impasse on evolution to a less feudal, 
more competitive structure) quiet diplomacy, other mediation, encouragement of sub-regional 
civil society initiatives and - perhaps - economic/diplomatic sanctions can sometimes be 
effective.
The need for sub-regional or OAU broad consensus (which might involve qualified majority 
rather than unanimity) if action is to be productive and not to split the acting group is 
somewhat different from the issue of whether action should be formally organisational, de 
fa c to  delegated to leading states and/or sub-regionally assented to national action. Except in 
the Lesotho case SADC has not acted in its own name but via South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and/or Botswana. Fairly clearly however consultations involving 
all or most SADC states have preceded the actions. In the Zaire and potentially the Sudan
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cases this approach has allowed South Africa to act as mediator - in practice to facilitate a 
change of regime - while other states took a more openly partisan position.
The need for business and civil society involvement in Pan African regionalism is both 
political and economic, normative and procedural. In respect to civil society it is a return to 
classical Pan Africanism but in respect to business it is part of incorporating articulated 
economic means for implementing steps toward self determination, self reliance and self 
respect. A functioning society - polity does have need to have three actors with discourse 
among them - government, enterprises, civil society. So too far a region.
In respect to business the problem is not primarily mechanical. Inclusion of Chambers of 
Commerce (and analogous) in consultation, specialised conferences and two way information 
flows is not uncommon. The problem is the tendency to parallel tunnel vision - each side 
focusing on lobbying at the other in respect to its own goals and neither focusing on 
areas of mutual interest and developing collaborative relationships. A linked set of issues 
(which also overlap transborder movement of people aspects of security) relates to trade 
unions which are civil society actors but also (primarily) economic ones like enterprises. In 
general state - employer - worker relations are national issues, but they do have regional 
ramifications (especially if limitations on worker rights arise from states and enterprises 
wishing to use such restrictions to compete against their neighbours, if cross border 
employment is large and/or extreme poverty generates large flows of economic refugees).
Civil society involvement - via organisations but also in a more general sense via sub-regional 
legislative or proto legislative bodies - is needed partly on good governance grounds and 
partly because Pan African awareness and especially support for sub-regional dynamics 
requires more than official meetings, press releases and gains which citizens do not 
automatically relate to regionalism. Further since civil society groups in SSA increasingly 
have both sub-regional and SSA wide forums with transborder concerns in many of the same 
areas as sub-regional bodies the potential value of discourse and - where possible - 
coordination and the potential costs of state/civil society tensions and conflicting regional 
actions can be or become serious.
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Sub-regional organisations need to develop strategy and structures in relations with civil 
society (including religious, women’s, community and domestic NGO’s) and with the 
economic sector (business, trade unions, farmer’s organisations). One of SADCC/SADC’s 
strengths has been an openness to contact and communication and inclusion of these groups in 
special conferences, but it cannot be said that adequate ongoing relations have to date been 
developed by SADC or ECOW AS or COMESA. In this case the EU institutional pattern of 
permanent consultative fora might be worth adaptation. The more general issue of 
accountability - while probably relevant only to SADC in the short term - needs to be 
revisited. There is a very strong case for a consultative, communicadon and revising assembly 
whose resolutions would (at the least) have substantial weight in official and ministerial work. 
The problem is that o f election. The old EAC had a lively Assembly of this kind, but its 
indirect election by (and usually from) national parliaments limited its two way communication 
impact although it also increased willingness to give it not inconsiderable legislative power - at 
least on paper. Direct election might be preferable, but so long as African sub-regional 
communities are basically multinational (coordinated and pooled nauonal sovereignty) rather 
than supranational (partially pooling with delegation of sovereignty in specified areas) 
presumably implies that at least the Summit of Heads of State and probably the Ministerial 
Council can override an Assembly vote (as in most cases in EU).
XIV. 
BUILDING BLOCKS TOWARD CONTINENTALISM
It is abundantly clear that an all inclusive military - governance - economic integration of 
all SSA states at one go is not on the cards now or ever. The very durability of the OAU
brokered African state system and of a majority of its members ensures that. The vision of 
Osagyefo cannot be reached by a great leap forward as he wished. The shift of Mwalimu from 
pre independence political federations to growing networks of common interests and 
institutions among broadening groups of independent states with actual political union well 
beyond the operational time horizon was probably correct in the early 1960’s and with the 
passage of time is the only plausible game in town (or on the continent).
54
This approach implies sub-regional building blocks among states with more linkages and 
perceived common interests extending over time to incorporate neighbours (as with Rwanda, 
Burundi, Sudan and Zaire in PTA COMESA and Namibia, South Africa and Mauritius) in 
SADCC/SADC. The continental level - OAU, UNECA, ADB - should play visionary, 
complementary and coordinating roles. But the paucity of resources of all three bodies, the 
lack of real ECA accountability to African states and the ADB’s concentration on rebuilding 
its capacity and reputation as a financial mobiliser and provider mean that at present the 
continental role is likely to be muted. Sub regionalism does appear to be the main potential 
1997-2007 vehicle for a building block approach.
The building block scenario for continental - or SSA - regionalism posits that both the habit 
of cooperation built up in smaller groupings and the lesser problems of bringing 4 or 6 - say - 
sub-regional units than 52 or 53 states together make this step by step path prudent or even 
necessary. However, the initial projection apparently was one of rapid evolution of strong, 
comparable sub-regional units throughout Africa (or at least SSA) - a process that has not 
taken place requiring a revisiting of possible revised scenarios.
In fact Eastern and Southern Africa has the only two dynamic Sub-Regional Communities - 
COM ESA and SADC. These overlap though in ways which would logically facilitate merger 
(not take-over). For historic reasons merger is not an immediate possibility. ECOWAS 
certainly exists and might become dynamic again. If it did so in ways producing clear 
economic gains (including in respect to tariffs and other aspects of trade and clearing) then its 
gradual integration with the non-currency elements of Francophone W est African coordination 
should no longer pose insuperable problems. Equatorial Africa, the Horn and North 
Africa in practice have no sub-regional groups. Therefore a literal reading of Abuja of 
achieving five sub-regional communities (by 1995) and merging then (about 2000) is not self 
evidently practicable even with adjusted target dates.
A Horn grouping may come into existence - either within COMESA or, like SADC, 
overlapping it. If convergence among S ADCC/COMES A-Horn can be achieved then Egypt 
might consider accession. On the other side of the continent Congo (ex Zaire) is more likely 
to join SADC than to seek to revive the Equatorial (Central African) paper community or to 
pursue its inherited paper membership of COMESA. Thus a building block dynamic from 
South Africa through Congo, up the Indian Ocean and Red Sea coasts to Cairo and including
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the Indian Ocean states may be the most viable one. While initially not including ECOWAS or 
the six Equatorial states north of Zaire, the process might catalyse forward movement in 
ECOWAS and (apart from their monetary union) the Equatorial 6 could join ECOWAS or 
divide (Cameroon-Tchad-Equatorial Guinea to ECOWAS and Gabon, CAR, Congo-Brazza 
with Congo-ex Zaire - to SADC respectively).
The keys to extending Pan African dynamics via the building block approach lie in 
SADC and the Horn. The achievement of decent, legitimate governance in Congo (ex 
Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi (to which SADC and in particular South Africa, Angola and 
Tanzania are devoting substantial attention and resources) would almost certainly lead to their 
accession. That would create strong economic reasons for both Kenya (which would be 
welcome only after the restoration of more consensual, more broadly accepted as legitimate, 
governance) and Uganda creating a very real Southern-Equatorial-Eastern African grouping 
with political economic and security goals in large part pursued by economic means. With a 
new legitimate, federal regime in the Sudan, the Horn would become a real political economic 
region led by the Sudan and Ethiopia and creating leverage toward at least a peaceful quasi 
federal settlement in Somalia (with or without confederation with Somaliland and Djibouti). 
The amalgamation of that grouping with SADC - East Africa - Congo would pose technical 
and timing issues but few basic political security or political economic problems. At that point 
economic and African frontier security goals (the SSA partners would not wish to become 
embrangled in the West Asian security issues central to Mahgreb in states) would make 
accession attractive to Egypt. Ironically perhaps “Cape to Cairo” may yet become a Pan 
African unifying axis politically and economically though not in the mode championed by Cecil 
John Rhodes.
It is easy to dismiss such a scenario as daydreaming (or over consumption of khat/q’at). 
Certainly there are obstacles and chances for division. But in 1980 (and even more in 1986) a 
prediction that by 1997 SADCC would be on the way to real integration including South 
Africa and its main security problems would be agreed water use rights and food security 
against drought and facilitating the achievement of good governance in Rwanda, Burundi and 
Congo (ex Zaire) would have appeared an even less credible scenario.
On the 40th Anniversary of the independence of Ghana, the first African state 
committed to Pan Africanism the outlook for a renewed dynamic to African self
56
reliance, self determination and self respect via political economic and security 
strategies pursued by the means of economic integration is more positive than it has 
been for nearly three decades. Southern African sub-regionalism is on the move and can 
merge with East African; the chaos of Central/Equatorial Africa and the Horn do show signs 
of removing entrenched, oppressive malgovernance and permitting forward movement.
Bitterly ironically it is now West Africa which increasingly lags - where 40 years ago it led - in 
Pan African and sub-regional terms.
The role o f leadership matters, but not solely in the sense of individual leaders 
important as they are contextually and as catalysts. Certainly FLS would not have 
become a force when and as it did without President Nyerere and nor would SADC have been 
launched when and as it was without the visions of President Khama and President Kaunda as 
well as Mwalimu. Certainly some ministers have been crucial or at least catalytic in key areas
e.g. Senator Dennis Norman of Zimbabwe (as he then was) in launching SADC’s Food 
Security Unit and again - as Minister of Transport - in the successful struggle to prevent the 
Great Drought of 1991-92 and Great Dearth of 1992-93 from becoming the Great Death of 
1993 or then Minister Adedeji of Nigeria in the creation of ECOWAS. Officials too have been 
key - e.g. Lebang Mpotokwane of Botswana as founding de facto  Executive Secretary and 
later interim Executive Secretary of SADCC and Secretary General Adedeji of ECA. But 
individuals cannot play such roles unless their national contexts provide backing - otherwise 
their endeavours either bombinate in a vacuum or, at best, flicker out when they leave the 
scene. Equally key is that of countries and of governance systems and goals built into 
their institutional and political structures committed to regionalism which are not 
dependent on one leader and, therefore, are more enduring. Small countries can play 
catalytic roles e.g. Botswana in SADCC and (not entirely intentionally) Rwanda in creating 
the opening for sub-regional change in Equatorial Africa. But the big battalions m atter - 
SADC’s dynamism today depends to a large extent on South Africa’s deep involvement and 
commitment while it is Ethiopia’s new government and governance that have created the - as 
yet problematic - dynamic toward a New Horn Sub Region. In West Africa Ghana and
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perhaps Senegal and Mali are minded to and could play significant supporting roles, albeit 
Cote d ’Ivoire and Cameroon are concerned primarily with serious internal political and social 
cleavages and thus distracted. The basic problem is Nigeria. Its malgovernance is not simply 
tragic for Nigerians. That sickness is contagious, prevents ECOWAS from becoming a West 
African FLS/SADCC and condemns West African Pan Africanism (at least at state level) and 
regionalism to drifting - drifting in a leaking boat with a rising wind on a lee share - the 
ironbound, breaker barred coast of West Africa.
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